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ARTICLES
CLOSING THE GAP IN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER CIVILIANS ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED
FORCES ABROAD-A FIRST PERSON ACCOUNT
OF THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT OF
2000
Glenn R. Schmitt'
The problem of American civilians committing crimes while
accompanying the Armed Forces abroad has long plagued the United
States Government. Because America's federal criminal jurisdiction
generally ends at the nation's borders, it is often left to host nation
countries to use their own laws to prosecute Americans who commit
crimes while they are living in those countries with our Armed Forces.
In many cases, however, these countries fail to prosecute crimes
committed by American civilians, even very serious ones. This is
especially so if the crime was committed only against an American or
against American property. While our government often imposes an
administrative sanction against the person committing the crime, such as
barring them from American military installations, more often than not
this jurisdictional gap in the law often allows the perpetrators of these
crimes to go unpunished. With the dramatic increase in the number of
+ B.S., Indiana State University; 1983; J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1986; M.P.P.,
Harvard University, 1994. From 1994 to 2001 the author served as a counsel on the
Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives, and as chief counsel of
its Subcommittee on Crime from 1999 to 2001. He was one of the drafters of H.R. 3380,
106th Cong. (1999) and played a key role during the amendment process of the bill as its
passed through the House and was enacted into law as S. 768, the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act of 2000. He also drafted the House Judiciary Committee's report on H.R.
3380 (see infra note 257). The author is also a judge advocate in the United States Army
Reserve.
1. See, e.g., Richard Roesler, Civilians in Military World Often Elude Prosecution,
STARS AND STRIPES, Apr. 10, 2000, at 3. In his report, Roesler notes recent incidents of
rape, arson, drug trafficking, assaults, and burglaries that went unpunished when the host
nation declined to prosecute. Id.
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American troops stationed overseas since the end of the Second World
War came an unprecedented number of American civilian dependents
and non-military government employees accompanying those troops. As
a result, the gap in the law became a serious problem for our
government, one which was not solved for over forty years.
Recently, Congress closed this gap by enacting the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (Act).2 The Act effectively
establishes federal criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed outside
the United States by persons employed by or accompanying the United
States Armed Forces. It also extends federal criminal jurisdiction to
members of the Armed Forces who commit crimes abroad but who are
not tried for those crimes by military authorities and who are no longer
under military control. In both instances, this legislation represents a
major step in extending the reach of American law outside the United
States, and it is the culmination of over forty years of work by lawyers
and policy makers in both the legislative and executive branches of the
government.
I was privileged to have had a role in crafting the legislation that closed
this gap and to have seen it through to enactment. This Article discusses
that process. It first examines how the gap developed and the impact
that gap caused.3 Next, this Article discusses the unsuccessful efforts of
Congress to close the gap over the years and will trace the development
of the legislation through Congress.4 The Article concludes by analyzing
each section of the Act and discusses some gray areas in the law that may
need further congressional action.'
I. THE GAP IN JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES COMMITTED BY
AMERICANS SERVING IN OR ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES: THE LIMITS ON PROSECUTING CRIMES
COMMITTED BY AMERICANS ABROAD
In this section, I discuss the legal and practical limits our government
faces in prosecuting criminal acts committed by Americans while our
Armed Forces serve in foreign countries. I discuss American criminal
jurisdiction over both members of the military and the civilians
accompanying them.
2. Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267).
3. See infra notes 6-134 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 135-275 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 276-361 and accompanying text.
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A. United States Prosecution of Crimes Committed by Members of the
Armed Forces
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 6 regulates the conduct
of all persons serving in the United States Armed Forces! Its purpose is
to "promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in
the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the
United States."8  The UCMJ relates to a wide range of activities,
including offenses which are unique to the military as well as common
law crimes which, but for the offender's military status, would be
punishable under federal or state law, depending upon where the
conduct took place. Because of this overlapping jurisdiction, military
members who commit criminal acts in the United States may be punished
by a court-martial, applying the law of the UCMJ, or by a civilian court,
applying the applicable federal or state criminal law.
When a military member commits a criminal act outside the United
States, however, the person is subject to the jurisdiction of the nation in
which the criminal act occurs (as well as the UCMJ), provided there is a
functioning government in that nation. The determination of whether
the service member will be tried by the host nation's criminal justice
system or by a court-martial is often determined by a status of forces
agreement, commonly called a "SOFA." The United States enters into a
SOFA with the host nation, and the SOFA governs many aspects of the
deployment of American forces in that country. These agreements are
designed to strike a balance between the rights and obligations of the two
nations involved in the deployment of troops, the "sending state" and the
"receiving state," and to resolve as many issues as possible before that
deployment occurs. 9 The United States is a party to over one hundred
SOFAs with various countries throughout the world.'
With respect to criminal prosecutions, the most common SOFA," the
6. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
7. 10 U.S.C.A. § 802 (1994). The term "armed forces" is defined in section 101 (a)(4)
to mean the "Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard," 10 U.S.C. §
101(a)(4) (1994), and is used in that same manner in this Article.
8. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES I-1 (2000 ed.) (MCM).
9. Colonel Richard J. Erickson, Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharing of Sovereign
Prerogative, 37 A.F. L. REV. 137, 140 (1994).
10. Captain Mark E. Eichelman, International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for the
United States Military, THE ARMY LAWYER, Aug. 2000, at 23 n.4 (citing International &
Operational Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force,
International Negotiation & Agreement Handbook, tab 18 (2000)).
11. The "NATO SOFA" has become the model for most of the SOFAs that the
2001)
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA, 2 gives American
military authorities the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over acts
that violate United States laws but not host nation laws. The NATO
SOFA further gives the host nation exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
under its own laws that are not offenses under United States laws. 3
When an individual's actions violate the laws of both countries, the
SOFA gives either the United States or the host nation the primary right
of jurisdiction, depending on the circumstances of the offense. For
example, when a crime is committed as part of the official duties of the
military member, where the only victim is an American, or where the
injury is done to property owned by an American, the SOFA typically
gives the United States primary jurisdiction. These crimes are often
referred to as "official duty" and "inter se" cases, respectively.1 4 The
nation with the primary right of jurisdiction may waive that right, either
on its own initiative or at the request of the other nation."' If no SOFA
has been negotiated between the United States and the host nation, the
U.S. government usually requests that the host nation waive its primary
jurisdiction over the service member.
When it was first enacted, the UCMJ authorized prosecutions against
military members even after they had left the military, as long as they
had committed the crime while they were in the military and a federal
court had no jurisdiction over the crime. 6 In 1955, a military member
United States, and other nations enter into. BURDICK H. BRITTIN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 213 (1986); Steven G. Hemmert, Note, Peace-Keeping
Mission SOFAs: U.S. Interests in Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 215, 226 n.91
(1999) (citing Major Steven J. Lepper, A Primer on Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 37 A.F.
L. REV. 169, 172 (1994)). The NATO SOFA was signed by all of the members of NATO
in 1951 and was an attempt to define, on a multilateral basis, the jurisdictional status of
military personnel stationed in NATO-member countries. BRITTIN, supra, at 212. When
the United States becomes involved in United Nations operations, the United Nation's
model SOFA usually governs. See Eichelman, supra note 10, at 25.
12. North Atlantic Treaty, June 19,1951,4 U.S.T. 1793 (1953).
13. See Eichelman, supra note 10, at 23-24; see also JOHN WOODLIFFE, THE
PEACETIME USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS UNDER MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 175-81 (1992); BRITTIN, supra note 11, at 214-17.
14. See WOODLIFFE, supra note 13, at 178-79.
15. 1d.
16. At that time, article 3(a) of the UCMJ provided:
Subject to the provisions of article 43, any person charged with having
committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an offense
against this code, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which
the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or
Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from
amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status.
50 U.S.C. § 553 (repealed 1956).
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challenged this provision in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles.7 This
was the first case in a series of Supreme Court decisions that severely
limited the military's authority to prosecute civilians for crimes
committed outside the United States. Robert Toth had served in Korea
as an enlisted man in the Air Force.' 8 Five months after he was
honorably discharged and had returned to the United States, Air Force
police arrested Toth and charged him with the murder of a Korean
national. 9 Toth was flown to Korea to face a court-martial."' His sister
filed a habeas corpus petition, on Toth's behalf, in Washington
challenging the U.S. government's authority to try him by court-martial.2'
In Toth, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not give the
military this authority.22 The Supreme Court recognized that Article I of
the Constitution granted Congress the power "To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," 3 and that
this power, as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause,24 was
the authority on which the UCMJ had been enacted. The Court
explained that the natural meaning of Article I "would seem to restrict
court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually members or part of
the armed forces., 25 Hence, the Court held that because Toth had been
discharged, he was now a civilian, and Congress' power to regulate the
military could not be used to subject him to trial by court-martial.26
The Court noted that there was "a compelling reason for construing
the clause this way," namely that "any expansion of court-martial
jurisdiction like that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on the
jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution
where persons on trial are surrounded with more constitutional
safeguards than in military tribunals., 27  The Court then noted the
preference in most countries for limiting military authority to the
narrowest jurisdiction deemed essential to maintain discipline among
troops in active service. It also noted the differences between military
17. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
18. Id. at 13.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id. at 25 (Reed, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 13-14.
23. Id. at 14; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
24. Toth, 350 U.S. at 14; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
25. Toth, 350 U.S. at 15.
26. Id. at 23.
27. Id. at 15.
2001]
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and civilian trials, stating "[t]here are dangers lurking in military trials
which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of
our Constitution. 2 8  The Court stated that upholding the provision
would sweep millions of former service personnel under the scope of
military authority and deny them the benefits guaranteed them in the
Constitution. 9
The military authorities released Toth and he evaded punishment for
his crime.3 ' Perhaps just as importantly, however, his case started a trend
that would eventually open a significant gap in the government's ability
to prosecute Americans who commit crimes while serving in or
accompanying the Armed Forces abroad.3'
B. United States Prosecution of Crimes Committed by Civilians
Employed by or Accompanying the Armed Forces
Civilians have served with or accompanied American Armed Forces in
the field or onboard ship since the founding of the United States, though
not in significant numbers until the Civil War. Since that time, civilian
employees have commonly accompanied the Armed Forces to war.
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, thousands of
Department of Defense (DoD) civilian and contract employees were
present in the host nations." With the rapid growth of contingency
operations following Operation Desert Storm, even more civilian and
contract employees have been deployed, to such places as Somalia, Haiti,
Kuwait, Rwanda, and the Balkans. These employees perform a wide
variety of functions, including: communications and equipment
maintenance, weapon system modernization, meal preparation, clothes
laundering, and logistics work. In 1999, there were more than 49,560
civilian employees of the Department of Defense working overseas."
28. Id. at 22.
29. Id. at 19, 23.
30. Id. at 23.
31. The specific holding of Toth, that discharged service members may not be
prosecuted under the UCMJ, has continued to plague the military. See Smith v.
Vanderbush, 47 M.J. 56, 61 (C.A.A.F. 1997). See also generally Lt. Col. Robinson 0.
Everett & Lt. Laurent R. Hourcle, Crime Without Punishment - Ex-Servicemen, Civilians
Employees and Dependents, 13 U.S.A.F. JAG L. REV. 184 (1971); Harvey A. Goldman,
Note, Jurisdictional Problems Related to the Prosecution of Former Servicemen for
Violations of the Law of War, 56 VA. L. REV. 947 (1970).
32. Approximately 4,500 DoD civilian employees and over 3,000 contractors were
deployed with the force. Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law Jurisdiction
Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Time of Armed Conflict 16 (Apr. 18,
1997) [hereinafter Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee Report].
33. Department of Defense, Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical
[Vol. 51:55
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Similarly, when the Cold War in Europe required large numbers of
American troops be stationed on military bases in foreign countries, the
U.S. government was forced to allow large numbers of dependents to
accompany those troops overseas.34 In fact, since the end of the Second
World War, family members of American military personnel and DoD
civilian employees have represented the largest segment of civilians who
accompany United States forces overseas. In 1999, there were more than
193,000 dependent family members living with military members
abroad.35 More than 14,000 dependents of DoD civilian employees were
36
already living overseas that year.
1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilians
Civilians accompanying the Armed Forces "in the field" have been
subject to trial by court-martial since the Revolutionary War.3' The 1775
Articles of War provided that "[a]ll [s]uttlers and [r]etainers to a [c]amp,
and all [p]ersons whatsoever, [s]erving with [ojur [a]rmys in the [flield,
[though] no [e]nlisted [s]oldiers, are to be [s]ubject to [o]rders, according
to the [r]ules & [d]iscipline of [w]ar."38 The term "retainers to a camp"
was understood to include civilians not actually in the government's
service (e.g., privately employed "officer's servants" as well as "camp
followers" such as suttlers and their employees, newspaper
correspondents, and telegraph operators).3 9 The term "persons serving
with the armies in the field" meant civilians who were employed by the
40government. In both cases, however, jurisdiction was dependent on
their actually serving in the field; a mere employment relationship with
the government did not suffice.4'
Area 15-17 (Sept. 30, 1999) [hereinafter DIOR Report]. This figure represents a decrease
from more than 96,000 civilian employees in 1996. See Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory
Committee Report, supra note 32, at 24.
34. THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
CORPS, 1775-1975, at 225 (1993).
35. DIOR Report, supra note 33, at 27.
36. Id.
37. See FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE 22-
23 (1967). The American practice simply copied the British practice, which dated from at
least 1747. Id. at 22 n.80.
38. Id. at 22; see also American Articles of War of 1775, Article XXIII, in WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 950 (1920). This provision was taken
almost verbatim from the British Articles of War. See WINTHROP at 98; WIENER, supra
note 37, at 22.
39. WINTHROP, supra note 38, at 98-99.
40. Id. at 99.
41. Ex parte Henderson, 11 F. Cas. 1067,1069 (D. Ky. 1878).
2001]
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In 1916, the Articles of War were expanded to grant court-martial
jurisdiction over all civilians accompanying the Armed Forces outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, even those not "in the
field., 42 In addition, the articles continued to provide for jurisdiction "in
time of war" over all "retainers and persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States in the field, both within and without
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States., 43 While the articles were
used during both World Wars I and II to try civilians accompanying the
Armed Forces in the field by court-martial for violations of the articles,' 4
the judicial tests of their scope were limited to the wartime "in the field"
provision.
Court-martial jurisdiction in the Navy evolved in a manner similar to
that of the Army. But because few civilians were commonly present
aboard military vessels, court-martial jurisdiction under the Articles of
the Government of the Navy was limited to "persons belonging to the
Navy" or similarly defined groups.46 It was not until 1943 that Congress
amended these articles to extend their reach to persons "accompanying
or serving with the United States Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Coast
Guard when serving as part of the Navy., 47 Even then, however, the
articles governed the conduct of civilians only when they were "outside
the continental limits of the United States. ,48
When the UCMJ was enacted in 1950, it contained three provisions
that expressly authorized the use of courts-martial to try civilians
accompanying the military for acts that violated the UCMJ.4 9 The
42. WIENER, supra note 37,at 227-29.
43. Id. at 228.
44. See, e.g., Ex parte Gerlach, 247 F. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (civilian outside the
United States); Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir. 1919) (contract employee in the United
States); In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 1944) (civilian outside the United States);
McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943) (civilian inside the United States).
45. WIENER, supra note 37, at 229.
46. Thomas G. Becker, Justice on the Far Side of the World: The Continuing Problem
of Misconduct by Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 277, 280 (1995).
47. Id. at 281.
48. Id.
49. 10 U.S.C.§ 802(a)(10)-(12) (1994). Article 2(a) of the UCMJ provides that:
The following persons are subject to [the UCMJ]...
(10) In time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in
the field.
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may
be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with,
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and
outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
[Vol. 51:55
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language of these provisions was very similar to the provisions in the
1916 Articles of War concerning military jurisdiction over civilians. The
UCMJ provisions authorized trial by court-martial of persons serving
with or accompanying the Armed Forces in the field in time of war;
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the Armed Forces
outside the United States; and persons within an area leased by or
otherwise reserved or acquired for the use by the United States.0
Beginning in 1957, however, in the wake of the Toth decision, a series of
Supreme Court decisions severely limited the application of those
provisions, effectively limiting court-martial jurisdiction over civilians
accompanying the military only to times of war declared by Congress.
Article 2(a)(11) was the first to fall to constitutional challenge. In
1957, the Supreme Court held, in Reid v. Covert,12 that the military did
not have criminal jurisdiction over civilians who were accompanying the
armed forces abroad. 3 Covert actually involved a rehearing of two cases,
both of which had been decided during the Court's previous (1955-1956)
term. When these cases were first considered, the Court had upheld the
military's authority to court-martial civilians for crimes that violated the
UCMJ.
54
a. The Pause Before the Fall
In the first case, Reid v. Covert,55 Clarice Covert murdered her Air
Force sergeant husband while they were living in England, where he was
stationed.16 Covert was tried by an American court-martial in England
under a 1942 executive agreement that had been entered into with the
British authorities that gave the American government exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes committed by Americans in those regions.5 7
(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement . . . or to any accepted rule of
international law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or
acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of the
Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States ....
Id.
50. Id.
5t. For a more extensive review of the history of court-martial jurisdiction over
civilians see Major Susan S. Gibson, Lack of Exterritorial Jurisdiction over Civilians: A
New Look at an Old Problem, 148 MIL. L. REV. 114 (1995).
52. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
53. Id. at 40-41.
54. Id. at 3.
55. 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
56. Id. at 488.
57. Id. at 488; see also Executive Agreement of July 27, 1942, 57 Stat. 1193 (1944).
2001]
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Covert was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in the United
States by the military court martial.58 Covert's conviction was then set
aside by a lower federal court for errors in the treatment of her insanity
defense. She was transferred from a federal prison to the District of
Columbia jail and held pending a retrial by court-martial in
Washington. 59  While she was in the District of Columbia jail, the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Toth, and ten days later Covert
filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that Article 2(a)(11) of the UCMJ
was unconstitutional as applied to her.0'
In the second case, Kinsella v. Krueger,6M Dorothy Krueger Smith
(Smith) murdered her husband, a colonel in the Army, while he was
stationed in Japan.62 The Army asserted court-martial jurisdiction over
Smith under article 2 (a) (11) and pursuant to an administrative
agreement with Japan that granted the United States exclusive
jurisdiction to try offenses against the laws of Japan committed by
61
military personnel, civilians working for the military, and dependents.
A court-martial in Tokyo tried, convicted, and sentenced Smith to life
imprisonment. 64 After she was transferred to the same federal prison
where Covert was incarcerated, Smith's father learned that Covert's
conviction had been set aside.65 Encouraged by this ruling, Smith's father
filed a habeas corpus petition on Smith's behalf, asserting that article
2(a)(11) violated her right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Seventh
66Amendments to the Constitution,
Justice Clark, who wrote the majority opinion in both cases, noted that
it had been "clearly settled" since 1922 that the jury trial provisions of
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution did not apply
67
outside the United States. As a result, the defendants were only
entitled to fundamental guarantees of due process, which the Court held
were found in the UCMJ. 68 Justice Clark stated that the Court had
58. Covert, 351 U.S. at 488.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
62. Id. at 471-72.
63. Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security Treaty Between the
United States of America and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, U.S. - Japan, art. XVII, 3 U.S.T. 3342,
3353-54.
64. Krueger, 351 U.S. at 471-72.
65. WIENER, supra note 37 at 237-38.
66. Krueger, 351 U.S. at 472; WIENER, supra note 37, at 238.
67. Krueger, 351 U.S. at 475.
68. Id. at 476.
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previously upheld trials by courts created by Congress where the crimes
occurred in foreign countries.6 9 Accordingly, no right to trial by an
Article III court was guaranteed to persons outside of the United
States.7° Justice Clark noted particularly to In re Ross,7 a case involving
an American seaman who murdered an officer aboard his ship while it
was in Japan and who was later tried by a "consular court" there.72 In
Ross, the Court held that the Constitution applied "only to citizens and
others within the United States, or who are brought there for trial for
alleged offen[c]es committed elsewhere, and not to residents or
temporary sojourners abroad."73 In Krueger, Justice Clark pointed out
that Ross had been cited with approval in a 1929 decision of the Court.74
Justice Clark stated that the decisions "establish[ed] beyond question
that the Constitution does not require trial before an Article III court in
a foreign country for offenses committed there by an American citizen."75
Justice Clark wrote that the Court did not need to reach the question
of whether Congress' power to "make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces 7 6 allowed it to subject civilians
to trial under the UCMJ. 77 Applying a reasonableness test, Justice Clark
stated that it was not improper for Congress to provide, through the
UCMJ, that the same legal system apply to both the civilian and military
populations living together in various parts of the world because of the
781American military's presence there.
In an interesting digression, Justice Clark noted that "the essential
choice involved here is between an American and a foreign trial" and
that foreign nations had relinquished their right to try crimes committed
by Americans only pursuant to "carefully drawn agreements which
presuppose[d] prompt trial by existent authority., 79 Justice Clark stated
that absent the effective exercise of the jurisdiction, which the foreign
nations had ceded to the United States government, there would be no
reason to suppose that host nations "would not exercise their sovereign
69. Id. at 475.
70. Id. at 476.
71. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
72. Id. at 456-57; see also Krueger, 351 U.S. at 475.
73. Ross, 140 U.S. at 464.
74. Krueger, 351 U.S. at 476 (citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929)).
75. Id. at 476.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 14.
77. Krueger, 351 U.S. at 476.
78. Id. at 476-77.
79. Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
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right to try and punish for offenses committed within their borders." "
Justice Clark suggested that Congress had made a prudential decision in
enacting the civilian jurisdiction provisions of the UCMJ, namely that
trial by court-martial "in which the fundamentals of due process are
assured" was more favorable than leaving military personnel and
dependents "subject to widely varying standards of justice unfamiliar to
our [own] people.""' Unfortunately, Justice Clark's prediction as to the
actions foreign governments would take to prosecute crimes committed
by Americans in their countries did not prove to be correct. In fact,
rather than varying standards of justice, in many cases there has been no
justice imposed whatsoever.
Justice Frankfurter filed a reservation in which he chose not to take a
position in the case because it had been decided only eight days after it
was argued."' However, Frankfurter's reservation reflected a strong
disagreement with the majority's reasoning. "3 Questioning the continued
relevance of Ross, Frankfurter took issue with Justice Clark's statement
in the majority opinion that the Court did not need to address the issue
of whether Congress was acting within its power to regulate the military
when it enacted article 2(a)(11). 84 Frankfurter said that this statement
raised the "plain inference. . . that the Court [was] not prepared to
support the constitutional basis upon which the Covert and Smith courts-
martial were instituted and the convictions were secured." 85 Frankfurter
then chastised the majority for not allowing more time to consider more
fully the views of all of the Court members.86  As it turned out,
Frankfurter discomfort with the Court's reasoning would be justified.
b. Covert Reconsidered- The Beginning of the Fall of Court-Martial
Jurisdiction Over Civilians
Later that year, the Court granted a rehearing of both cases, 7 which
were reargued in February of 1957. A new decision in the combined
80. Id.
81. Id. (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 481-85 (Frankfurter, J., reservation). Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Black and Douglas joined in a short dissent in which they noted their intent to file full
dissents during the Court's next term because they needed more time than was available at
the end of the 1.955 Term in which to write their views. Id. at 486 (Warren, C.J., Black and
Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
83. Id. at 484 (Frankfurter, J., reservation).
84. Id. at 482 (Frankfurter, J., reservation).
85. Id. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., reservation).
86. Id. at 485 (Frankfurter, J., reservation).
87. Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 901 (1956).
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cases was handed down on June 10.88 This time, the Court, with Justices
Reed and Minton retired and new Justice William Brennan taking part in
the case, reversed its holding from the prior term. 9 Justice Black wrote a
plurality opinion (joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas
and Brennan) in which he stated, "[a]t the beginning we reject the idea
that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free
of the Bill of Rights." 90  Justice Black noted that because the U.S.
government is created by the Constitution, it can only act within the
limitations imposed on it and that, as a result, "[w]hen the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of
Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another land."9'
Justice Black held that primary among these rights was the right to
trial and indictment by a jury, and because courts-martial did not offer
trial and indictment by a jury, court-martial jurisdiction over civilians was
"inconsistent with both the 'letter and the spirit of the Constitution.' 92
Justice Black rejected the argument that Congress' power to regulate the
land and naval forces allowed it to extend military jurisdiction to
dependents. 3
Justice Black noted that Article III of the Constitution provided for
trials by jury even when the alleged crimes were committed outside of
the United States.94 In addition to the Article III provision, the Fifth
Amendment provision regarding indictment by a grand jury and the
Sixth Amendment provision guaranteeing the right to trial by jury were
considered sweeping in their scope, and proved that the Constitutional
protections for the individual "were designed to restrict the United
States Government when it acts outside of this country, as well as here at
88. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
89. See id. at 3, 5. Justice Whittaker did not participate in the case. Id. at 41.
90. Id. at3,5.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id. at 21-22.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id. at 21. Article III provides:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. Congress has, by statute, directed the place for the Trial
of crimes committed outside the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1994); see also infra note
349 and accompanying text.
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home." 95 Justice Black downplayed the importance of the Ross decision,
relied on by Justice Clark in the prior term, as proof that Congress
intended to establish legislative courts with the authority to try civilians
for crimes committed outside of the country.96 Justice Black said, "Ross.
. cannot be understood except in its peculiar setting; even then, it seems
highly unlikely that a similar result would be reached today." 97 Justice
Black stated that the statutes under which Ross was tried blended
executive, legislative, and judicial power in one person (the American
consul in each country) and that such a blending of power is ordinarily
recognized as the "very acme of absolutism." 98 Justice Black pointed out
that Congress had "recently buried the consular system of trying
Americans"9 9 and concluded that the holding in Ross that "the
Constitution has no applicability abroad has long since been directly
repudiated by numerous cases. '
In reviewing whether the government had any authority to try Covert
and Smith by court-marital, Justice Black commented on the significance
of the respective agreements with England and Japan under which
Covert and Smith had been tried by court-martial, rather than by a court
of the host nation.'0' Black stated that because the American
government was "a creature of the Constitution," its power to enter into
agreements with other nations could not exceed its authority under the
Constitution."'2 Thus, those agreements could not overcome the fact that
the courts-martial in those cases did not comply with the rights that
Covert and Smith enjoyed under Article III and the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments to the Constitution.
Next, Justice Black turned to the government's argument that its
power under the Constitution to regulate the "land and naval Forces"
also gave it the power to court-martial the defendants.' °4 Justice Black
stated that the clear language of the Constitution demonstrated that the
provision did not apply to civilians."'5 Justice Black then digressed into a
95. Reid, 354 U.S. at 7.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 10.
98. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 15-16.
102. Id. at 5-6.
103. Id. at 18-19.
104. Id.
105 Id
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long discussion about the abuse of military power by Great Britain
during the 1700s and noted that the U.S. Constitution embodied a
distrust of military power. '° Justice Black stated that "[i]n light of this
history, it seems clear that the Founders had no intention to permit the
trial of civilians in military courts, where they would be denied jury trials
and other constitutional protections, merely by giving Congress the
power to make rules" for the military.' 7 Citing the Court's ruling in
Toth, Justice Black noted that Toth's conduct while a military member
bore a closer relationship to the maintenance of good order and
discipline in the Air Force than the conduct of the wives at issue in the
cases before the Court.'0 8 Yet in Toth, the Court had found that the
military had no authority over the defendant once he had been
discharged and became a civilian.' 9 Justice Black concluded that "[w]e
should not break faith with this Nation's tradition of keeping military
power subservient to civilian authority, a tradition which we believe is
firmly embodied in the Constitution.'' 0
c. The End of Jurisdiction Resulting From Employment by or
Accompanying the Military Abroad
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan each wrote an opinion concurring in
the result reached by the plurality and indicated that their decision was
based, at least in part, on the fact that the crimes at issue were capital
offenses."' To some observers, the Covert decision stood only for the
proposition that the UCMJ could not be used to try civilians for capital
crimes.
It did not take long for the Court to clarify this issue. In early 1960, the
Court held that the UCMJ could not be used to try dependents in
noncapital cases."2 On the same day, the Court decided a companion
case in which it considered whether the UCMJ could be applied to
civilian employees."' Not surprisingly, the Court held that the UCMJ
could not be used to try civilian employees for capital offenses." 4 The
Court also held that there were not "any valid distinctions" between
106. Id. at 28-30.
107. Id. at 30.
108. Id. at 39.
109. See generally Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
110. Reid, 354 U.S. at 40.
111. Id. at 41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 65 (Harlan, J., concurring).
112. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960).
113. Grisham v. Hagen, 361 U.S. 278, 279 (1960).
114. Id. at 280.
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civilian employees and dependents as to warrant different treatment
under the UCMJ."5 The evisceration of Article 2(a)(11) was complete
when the Court held in a third opinion that the UCMJ could not be used
to try civilian employees in noncapital cases.'16
d. Averette- The Limiting of "Time of War" Jurisdiction Over
Civilians
Article 2(a)(10), which allows the military to assert court-martial
jurisdiction over civilians serving with or accompanying an Armed Force
in the field in time of war, "7 has been similarly limited, although perhaps
not as completely or as convincingly as article 2(a)(11). During the
Vietnam conflict, four civilians were court-martialed under article
2(a)(10)."" One of these civilians appealed his case to the United States
Court of Military Appeals in 1970."9 In United States v. Averette,1211 that
court reviewed the court-martial conviction of an Army civilian
employee who had been convicted in Vietnam of attempted larceny of
thirty-six thousand batteries, which were the property of the U.S.
government. 2' The court noted the Covert line of cases, but pointed out
that those cases dealt with crimes committed during peacetime and "did
not constitute authority that even in time of declared war courts-martial
have no jurisdiction to try those who are not members of the armed
forces...,,122 Yet, the court held that the words "in times of war," found
in article 2(a)(10), mean a war formally declared by Congress. 23 Perhaps
sensing the future of American military involvement in the world, the
court stated that "[a] broader construction... would open the possibility
of civilian prosecutions by military courts whenever military action on a
varying scale of intensity occurs.' ' 24 Accordingly, the charges against
Averette were dismissed.'25
The Averette decision is now reflected in the military's Rules for
Courts-Martial. Rule 1.03(19) defines "time of war" as "a period of war
115. Id.
116. McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 286 (1960).
117. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (1994).
118. LT. COL. GARY D. SOLIS, MARINES AND MILITARY LAW IN VIETNAM: TRIAL
BY FIRE 168 (1989) (endnote omitted).
119. United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363 (C.M.A. 1970).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 363.
122. Id. at 364.
123. Id. at 365.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 366.
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declared by Congress or the factual determination by the President that
the existence of hostilities warrants a finding that a 'time of war' exists
• .,6 Of course, Congress has not declared war since 1941, and while the
latter part of the definition in the rules might suggest some room for a
future Commander-in-Chief to open the door to military prosecutions of
civilians, it has not yet occurred. In fact, during Operation Desert Storm,
a military conflict following the Averette decision that most would have
warranted such a determination and thus the exercise of article 2(a)(10)/ . .• 127
jurisdiction, the President did not make such a determination. If
Congress were to actually declare war in the future, the Averette test
would be met. Until there is a declared war, however, the question
remains open as to whether the trend of the Covert cases regarding
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians will continue.
This question may never be answered given the broad jurisdiction
conferred by the Military Exterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000. This
new statute effectively eliminates any need, other than expediency, for
the military to attempt to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over civilians
when abroad.
e. Article 2(a)(12) - The Untested Basis of Jurisdiction Over Civilians
Article 2(a)(12) is the final UCMJ article that authorizes the military
to try civilians accompanying the Armed Forces by court-martial. It
grants the military jurisdiction over persons within an area leased by or
otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States and is
outside the United States, however, there is no record that this article
has ever been used. 129 The jurisdictional sweep of paragraph (a)(12) is
even broader than that of paragraph (a)(11) in that there is no
126. Rules for Courts-Martial 103(19), MCM, supra note 8, at 11-2. Interestingly,
however, the official analysis of that rule in the MCM points out that the phrase "time of
war" is used in six of the punitive articles of the UCMJ and that court decisions
interpreting this phrase for the purposes of those other statutes did not interpret it to
mean a war declared by Congress. Id. at A21-5. The analysis concludes that, "for at least
some purposes of the punitive articles, 'time of war' may exist without a declaration of
war." Id. However, all of the cases cited in the analysis were decided before the Averette
case. See id.
127. In fact, DoD went out of its way to note otherwise. See Gibson, supra note 51, at
133 n.120 (citing Message, Headquarters, Dep't of Army, DAJA-CL, subject: Time of War
Under the UCMJ and MCM (Feb. 8,1991)) ("For purposes of the UCMJ and the MCM,
Operation Desert Storm, in and of itself, does not warrant a finding that time of war exists
..... ). But see United States v. Castillo, 34 M.J. 1160, 1166-67 (N.M.C.M.R. 1992) (stating
that Desert Storm was a "time of war" for purposes of Article 90) (footnote omitted).
128. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(12) (1994).
129. Gibson, supra note 51, at 134.
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requirement that civilian defendants be employed by or accompanying
the Armed Forces, but only that they be found on property under the
control of the U.S. military. In light of the Covert line of cases, it is
doubtful that any attempt to use article 2 as a basis to assert court-martial
jurisdiction over civilians would pass constitutional review.
2. Federal and State Criminal Jurisdiction Outside the United States
While some federal criminal statutes are expressly extraterritorial, 3°
most apply only within "the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States""' or if the conduct they proscribe affects interstate
or foreign commerce. In most instances, therefore, federal criminal
jurisdiction ends at the nation's borders. Likewise, state criminal
jurisdiction ends at the boundaries of each state. Acts that civilians
commit while accompanying the Armed Forces in foreign countries,
which would be crimes if committed within the United States, often do
not violate either federal or state criminal law because of these
limitations on jurisdiction. In addition, acts committed by civilians do
not violate the UCMJ unless a "time of war" has been declared by
Congress when the acts are committed, and therefore these acts are
crimes only under the law of the country in which they occur.
C. Prosecution of United States Citizens by Host Nation Governments
Host countries often choose not to assert their jurisdiction over
American civilians who commit crimes in their countries; this is most
often the case when the crimes are committed against another American
or against property owned by an American. When the citizens or
property of the host nation are not damaged by an act, that nation often
has little interest in spending the time and resources of its police,
prosecutors, and courts to try Americans for the crime. Therefore, host
nations will often decline to bring a case. When a host nation decline to
prosecute, the perpetrator goes unpunished for his crime. Each year,
numerous incidents of rape, sexual abuse, aggravated assault, robbery,
drug distribution, fraud, and property crimes are committed by American
civilians abroad and go unpunished because the host nation chooses to
waive jurisdiction over these crimes."'
130. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1994) (destruction of aircraft); id. § 1837 (economic
espionage and theft of trade secrets); id. § 2332(b) (terrorism); id. § 2441 (war crimes).
131. This phrase is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
132. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Evaluation of Military
Criminal Investigative Organizations' Investigative Effectiveness Regarding U.S. Forces
Civilians Stationed Overseas, No. 99500091, 7-10 (Sept. 7, 1999) [hereinafter DoD IG
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This problem is compounded by the increased involvement of the
military in areas of the world where no functioning government exists to
prosecute these crimes (e.g., Somalia and Haiti). In other countries, the
United States has negotiated the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over its personnel. 13 3 Nonetheless, because United States law does not
apply to crimes committed by American civilians in these situations the
U.S. government is powerless to prosecute these crimes and the
perpetrators go unpunished.
D. Other Remedies Available to the U.S. Government
The only remedy typically available to the United States with respect
to military dependents, civilian employees, and contractors who commit
crimes in foreign countries is to limit their use of facilities on the
installation where they live, or to bar their entry onto the installation
altogether. These restrictions often cause the offenders to return to the
United States. Civilian employees of the United States may face the
further sanction of being administratively disciplined or even fired from
their job and barred from further employment by any DoD contractor.
During the Vietnam conflict, partly as a result of the Averette decision,
943 contract employees were "debarred.', 3 4 Similarly, the government
may choose to terminate the contract of a DoD contractor who commits
criminal acts or whose employees or subcontractors have committed the
acts. In any event, however, the fact that the person who committed the
act may return to the United States does not give rise to any jurisdiction
in the United States to try the crime he or she committed abroad.
II. WORKING TO CLOSE THE GAP ONCE AND FOR ALL
A. Recommendations for Congressional Action
For the more than forty years since the Covert decision, many efforts
were made to fill the jurisdictional void left by that line of cases.
Numerous bills designed to address the problem were introduced in
Report]; Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee Report, supra note 32, at 26; see also,
Roesler, supra note 1.
133. The Dayton Accords between the United States and the Balkan countries
specifically provided that the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
offenses committed by American civilians and military members. Military Exterritorial
Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary on H.R. 3380, 106th Cong. 19 (2000) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Barnes).
134. SOLIS, supra note 118, at 168.
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Congress but failed to pass both houses. 35 The issue also was raised
routinely in oversight hearings of the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees.'36 Reports on the problem were also issued by executive
and legislative branch agencies.
For example, in 1979, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a
report on the problem.3 7 The GAO found that in 1977, 343,000 civilians
had accompanied the forces abroad in a twelve-month period and that,
during that year, host countries exercised their jurisdiction in 200 serious
cases. 38 The GAO also found that host countries waived their right to
prosecute in fifty-nine serious cases (including rape, manslaughter, rape,
arson, robbery, and burglary) and in fifty-four less serious cases
(including simple assault, drug abuse, and drunkenness).'39 The GAO
concluded that the lack of criminal jurisdiction over civilians and the
inadequacy of administrative sanctions caused serious morale and
discipline problems in overseas military communities.'4 In the report,
the GAO recommended that Congress enact legislation to extend
criminal jurisdiction over American citizens accompanying the forces
141
overseas.
In 1982, the Judge Advocate General of the Army established a
"Wartime Legislation Team" to study the application of military lawdurin combt . 42
during combat operations. The members of that team made several
recommendations, including one urging that Congress extend court-
135. While at least twenty-seven different bills were introduced, many of them were
identical and were simply introduced by the same member of Congress in successive
Congresses. In some cases, a member introduced as his own bill the text of a bill that
another member had introduced in the same or a prior Congress. For a representative
sample of these bills see, e.g., S. 762, 89th Cong. (1965); S. 2007, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R.
18548, 91st Cong. (1970); S. 1, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 763, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 255,
99th Cong. (1985); S. 147, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 5808, 102d Cong. (1992); S. 2083, 104th
Cong. (1996). The text of most of these bills is available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
136. See, e.g., Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel before the Senate
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 848-49
(1962); Joint Hearings on Bills to Improve the Admin. of Justice in the Armed Services
before the Senate Subcomm. On Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary and a
Special Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong. 62-64 (1966)
(statement of Manss).
137. Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress: Some
Criminal Offenses Committed Overseas by DoD Civilians Are Not Being Prosecuted:
Legislation is Needed, Report No. FPCD 79-45 (1979).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 13-14.
141. Id. at 19.
142. GIBSON, supra note 51, at 137.
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martial jurisdiction over civilians and former military members.143
In 1995, Congress directed the DoD and the Department of Justice
(Justice) to establish jointly an advisory committee to "review and make
recommendations concerning the appropriate forum for criminal
jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces in the field
outside the United States in time of armed conflict."' 44 The advisory
committee's report was submitted to Congress in April 1997, and
recommended two changes in the law. First, the report recommended
that court-martial jurisdiction be extended to civilians accompanying the
Armed Forces during "contingency operations" as designated by the
Secretary of Defense.4 5 The advisory committee also recommended that
the jurisdiction of federal courts be extended to reach offenses
committed by civilians accompanying the Armed Forces abroad.
146
Recently, this issue was the focus of United States v. Gatlin,'47 a
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In that case, the judge suggested in his opinion that Congress address the
jurisdictional gap in the law.'48 In Gatlin, the civilian defendant was
charged with sexual abuse of his teenaged stepchild, the daughter of an
enlisted soldier to whom he was married.1 49 The abuse occurred while
the defendant was living with his wife and step-daughter in military
housing in Germany.15 0 The abuse, however, did not come to light until
they returned to the United States and the stepdaughter revealed that
she was pregnant with the defendant's child.' 5' The defendant was
charged with engaging in sexual acts with a minor 5 2 and pled guilty, but
before the plea was accepted he moved to dismiss the indictment for lack
of jurisdiction."5
The district court judge had ruled that the court had jurisdiction to try
the defendant because she determined that the American military
housing in Germany, where the acts occurred, was within the "special
143. Lt. Col. E.A. Gates & Maj. Gary V. Casida, Report to the Judge Advocate General
by the Wartime Legislation Team, 104 MIL. L. REV. 139, 148-49 (1984).
144. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §
1151, 110 Stat. 186 (1996).
145. Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee Report, supra note 32, at v-vi, 49.
146. Id. at vi, 49.
147. 216 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2000).
148. Id. at 223.
149. Id. at 210.
150. Id. at 209.
151. Id. at 210.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (1994).
153. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 210.
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maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," the
jurisdictional requirement for many federal criminal crimes. 5 4  On
appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court decision, holding
that the statute the defendant was charged with violating applied
exclusively to the territorial United States.'55 Because the jurisdictional
gap existed the defendant's conviction was reversed.
56
In his opinion, Circuit Judge Jose Cabranes noted the evolution of the
case law that gave rise to the gap in criminal jurisdiction over civilians
accompanying the military overseas and the fact that various
commentators had "urged Congress for over four decades to close the
jurisdictional gap by extending the jurisdiction of Article III courts to
cover offenses committed on military installations abroad and elsewhere
by civilians accompanying the armed forces. 1 57 He expressed his view
that the inaction by Congress "hardly can be blamed on a lack of
awareness of the gap" and that the court's decision to overturn the
defendant's conviction was "only the latest consequence of Congress's
failure to close this jurisdictional gap."'58 He wrote in the opinion that he
was taking "the unusual step of directing the Clerk of the Court to
forward a copy of this opinion to the Chairmen of the Senate and House
Armed Services and Judiciary Committees.
' '151
B. The Impact of the Gap
The most serious consequence of the jurisdictional gap in the law is
that persons who commit crimes while accompanying our Armed Forces
overseas often go unpunished. As discussed above, in the past, these
crimes have included such serious crimes as murder, sexual assault,
sexual abuse, arson, and drug trafficking."o Of course, while not every
154. Id.
155. Id. at 220.
156. But see United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d. 1166, 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000)
(reviewing Gatlin but reaching a conclusion directly contrary to it on similar facts). See
generally Jordan J. Paust, Non-Extraterritoriality of "Special Territorial Jurisdiction" of the
United States: Forgotten History and the Errors of Erdos, 24 YALE J. INT'L. L. 305 (1999)
(supporting the Gatlin court's reasoning).
157. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 221-22 (citing Becker, supra note 46; Captain Gregory A.
McClelland, The Problem of Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Forces
Overseas - Still with Us, 117 MIL. L. REV. 153 (1987); Everett & Hourcle, supra note 31;
Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Policing Civilians Accompanying the United States Armed Forces
Overseas: Can United States Commissioners Fill the Jurisdictional Gap?, 36 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 273 (1967)).
158. Id. at 222-23.
159. Id. at 223.
160. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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crime falling into the gap is a violent or sexual offense, no crime should
go unpunished if possible. Our government has an obvious moral
justification to seek to punish those who commit crimes while
accompanying the Armed Forces. Additionally, prosecuting these crimes
may deter others from committing further crimes, and is therefore
another justification for the government to act. In addition to these
traditional reasons to punish crime, there are several other reasons why
the government would seek to close the gap.
At the hearing on House Bill 3380, held by the Subcommittee on
Crime, Robert E. Reed, Associate Deputy General Counsel of the DoD
(who had been a member of the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory
Committee), testified that the gap has undermined the functioning of the
military. Reed testified:
The inability of the United States to appropriately pursue the
interests of justice and hold its citizens criminally accountable
for offenses committed overseas has undermined deterrence,
lowered morale, and threatened good order and discipline in
our military communities overseas. In addition, the inability of
U.S. authorities to adequately respond to serious misconduct
within the civilian component of the U.S. Armed Forces,
presents the strong potential for embarrassment in the
international community, increases the possibility of hostility in
the host nation's local community where our forces are
assigned, and threatens relationships with our allies.
161
Clearly, if military members learn that the government is powerless to
punish those who harm their families when they are stationed overseas,
they may be much less willing to accept overseas assignments, perhaps
even leaving the military to avoid those assignments. Word quickly gets
around the military housing areas of a foreign post or base once a serious
crime has occurred and the government proves unable to take action
against the perpetrator. Further, a military member is concerned over
the safety of his family members, he likely will be distracted from his
duties, especially if he is deployed from there to a more remote post
where his family may not accompany him (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo).
Compounding the problem even further, some people may choose to
take matters into their own hands and seek retribution for a crime
committed against their own family or the family of another once they
become aware that the government cannot punish the suspected
perpetrator. These actions would further undermine respect for good
order and discipline within the military community. Closing the
161. Hearings, supra note 133, at 17 (statement of Reed).
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jurisdictional gap prevents all of these problems.
Another area of concern involves unequal or unjust results that can
occur because of the jurisdictional gap. For example, in the event that a
military member and a civilian contractor commit a crime together and
the host nation is unwilling or unable to prosecute, the military member
would likely be punished under the UCMJ but the civilian would receive
no punishment. This unequal treatment could also affect morale within
the military.
A final reason to close the jurisdictional gap concerns our
government's ability to ensure due process to all of its citizens. Brigadier
General Joseph Barnes, the Assistant Judge Advocate General of the
Army, discussed this issue at the hearing before the crime subcommittee.
Barnes testified that closing the jurisdictional gap would allow the
United States to more "successfully negotiate the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over civilians" accompanying the Armed Forces in
future SOFA negotiations with host nations."' If host nations know that
American law does not allow the United States to punish its citizens
when they commit crimes while accompanying its military in a foreign
country, that nation is far less likely to negotiate away its right to
prosecute those civilians under its own law. As a result, Americans
suspected of crimes in a foreign country would be judged by legal
systems that may not offer the same protections to the falsely accused as
the United States provides. Closing the jurisdictional gap addresses this
problem by giving American negotiators of future SOFAs the ability to
more credibly seek agreement from the host nation that Americans
accused of crimes be brought to justice under the laws and procedures of
American courts.
C. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
After more than forty years of effort, Congress has now closed the
jurisdictional gap. On November 22, 2000, President Clinton signed into
law the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000. ' This Act
created a new federal crime involving conduct by military personnel and
civilians accompanying the Armed Forces abroad that would have been a
felony under federal law, had the conduct occurred within the United
States.'6 The punishment for the new crime is that which could have
162. Hearings, supra note 133, at 20 (statement of Barnes).
163. Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress for S. 768 (1999), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin.bdquery/z?dl 06:SN00768:@@@l&summ2=m&.
164. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, § 3261(a),
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been imposed under federal law had the crime been committed in the
United States."'
The new crime applies only to two groups of people: persons employed
by or who are accompanying the Armed Forces outside of the United
States and persons who are members of the Armed Forces. 166 As such,
the Act applies to civilian employees of the DoD, contract employees,
and dependents of military members. 6' The Act brings within its scope
American citizens and nationals, as well as persons who are nationals of
other countries.
68
Further, the Act allows for the prosecution of military members under
certain conditions. For example, military personnel who commit acts
that fall within the scope of the new crime created by the Act but are not
tried for their crimes under the UCMJ before leaving military control
(e.g., because the case was not solved before they were discharged from
the military, or because the person is no longer on active duty) may still
be prosecuted under the Act. Military personnel still on active duty
could also be prosecuted under the Act if they are indicted or otherwise
charged with committing the offense together with one or more non-
military co-defendants.
The Act prohibits prosecution under the new statute "if a foreign
government . . . has prosecuted or is prosecuting such person for the
conduct constituting the offense" in accordance with jurisdiction
recognized by the United States. However, the Act allows the
Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General to waive this
provision in appropriate cases. 7 0
The Act contains an unusual provision that requires most of the initial
proceedings in any case to be conducted before the defendant is brought
to the United States-in most cases by telephone. 7' A complementary
provision generally prohibits the forced return of a defendant to the
United States prior to those proceedings being held.' Each of these
provisions will be discussed in greater detail.
73
114 Stat. 2488 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3261).
165. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3261(a) (2001).
166. Id. §§ 3261(a); 3267.
167. Id. § 3267.
168. Id.
169. Id. § 3261(b).
170. See id.
171. Id. § 3265.
172. Id. § 3264.
173. See infra notes 298-332 and accompanying text.
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D. The Genesis and Evolution of the Act in Congress
1. The Senate Bill
After having been introduced in Congress in various forms for almost
forty years, a bill to extend federal criminal jurisdiction to civilians
accompanying the Armed Forces abroad was again introduced in the
106th Congress. Senator Jeff Sessions, a Republican from Alabama,
together with Senator Mike DeWine, a Republican from Ohio,
introduced Senate Bill 768.74
Sessions' interest in creating legislation to fill the jurisdictional gap
came about as the result of a constituent inquiry. 75 In early 1999, Arch
Galloway a staff person for military issues in Sessions' office, received a
call from a constituent, an enlisted man in the Army, who had just
returned from a tour of duty in Germany.7 The caller informed
Galloway that while he was in Germany, his seven-year-old daughter was
molested by the twelve-year-old son of another American service
person. 7 7 After the abuse occurred, German authorities took no action
against the boy. 7 8 Subsequently, the boy and his family returned to the
United States. 79 When the soldier asked American authorities to punish
the boy they informed him that no criminal charges could be brought
against the boy in the United States.80 The soldier then called Sessions'
office to ask that he become involved.1 81
Because the matter involved an interpretation of criminal law,
Galloway called Lloyd Peeples, a lawyer on the Senate Judiciary
Committee staff who also worked for Sessions,"" and asked that Peeples
174. Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress for S. 768 (1999), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:sn00768:@@@1 &summ2=m&.
175. Interview with Lloyd Peeples, Esq., former counsel for the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate (Nov. 13, 2000).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. All Members of Congress employ a staff to advise them on issues pending before
Congress. These staffers typically are known as "personal staff." Some Members,
principally committee and subcommittee chairmen and ranking minority members, are
authorized to hire additional staff to work for them on matters relating to their
responsibilities on a committee. These staffers typically are called "committee staff."
Galloway was a personal staffer, while Peeples was a committee staffer who worked for
Sessions in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Youth Violence.
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examine the case. 83 Peeples, in turn, called the staff of the legislative
affairs office in the DoD, one of several offices in the Pentagon that
handles inquiries from Members of Congress and their staffs.'m The
legislative affairs staff consulted with lawyers in the DoD's Office of
General Counsel who informed the legislative affairs office that United
States law did not apply to crimes committed abroad by American
military dependents.' 8 The Office of General Counsel also noted that
the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee had submitted a report
186
on the problem to Congress in 1997.
After Peeples learned all of this information, he reviewed the 1997
report and noticed that Brigadier General John Cooke, an Army lawyer,
had chaired the Committee."" Peeples had served as a summer intern for
Cooke and called him to discuss the problem and the recommendations
of the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee. 88  Peeples also
consulted with the authors of law review articles who had written on the
subject."89 All of Peeples' discussions confirmed that the problem was
significant.'9 In fact, some of the authors even suggested that crimes on
military bases were often under-reported and that the actual magnitude
of the problem might have been larger than most believed.9'
Peeples recommended to Sessions that he introduce the legislative
recommendations contained in the report of the Overseas Jurisdiction
Advisory Committee as a bill, and Sessions tentatively agreed.' 92 Peeples
and Galloway then asked the staff for Senator DeWine, who had
introduced similar legislation in each of the prior two Congresses,' 9'
whether he would object to Sessions taking the lead on the issue in the
new Congress. 9' DeWine's staff informed Peeples that DeWine had not
planned to make the issue a priority in the 106th Congress but was
interested in helping, since the mother of the abused child was from
183. Peeples interview.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See S. 172, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2083, 104th Cong. (1996). Neither of these two
bills contained the amendment to the UCMJ proposed by Senator Sessions in Senate bill
768.
194. Peeples interview.
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Ohio, 195 and so DeWine did not object to Sessions taking the lead on the
issue.' 96 Peeples also informed the staff for Senator Daniel Inouye, a
Democrat from Hawaii (and a Medal of Honor recipient) who also had
introduced similar legislation in prior Congresses, 97 that Sessions
planned to introduce a bill. 
98
Peeples then prepared the bill for Sessions, using the Overseas
Jurisdiction Committee's proposed language almost verbatim.' 99 Sessions
introduced Senate bill 768 on April 13, 1999.200 As introduced, the bill
would have created a new federal crime involving conduct by persons
"serving with, employed by, or accompanying the Armed Forces outside
of the United States" that would constitute a felony offense "if the
conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States."2 " The bill also would have amended
the UCMJ by adding a new paragraph to article 2(a), the jurisdiction
article of the UCMJ, that would have applied the UCMJ to DoD
employees and DoD contract employees if they were "serving with and
accompanying an armed force" while "in support of an operation
designated as a contingency operation.' 2  This second provision, which
had not been included in any of the bills introduced by Senator DeWine
or Senator Inouye in the prior Congresses, had been part of the proposed
legislative draft of the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee in its
report to Congress. As such, the provision was included in the Sessions
bill and used the committee's proposed language verbatim. The
language was a clear attempt by the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory
Committee to convince Congress to legislate around the holding in
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See S. 74, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 129, 103rd Cong. (1993); S. 182, 102d Cong.
(1991); S. 147, 101st Cong. (1989).
198. Peeples interview.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. S. 768, 106th Cong. § 3261(a) (1999). A copy of Senate bill 768 as it was originally
introduced in the Senate can be found, infra, at appendix A.
202. The text of proposed paragraph 13 was:
(13) To the extent not covered by paragraphs (10) and (11), persons not
members of the armed forces who, in support of an operation designed as a
contingency operation as described in section 101(a)(13)(A) of this title, are
serving with and accompanying an armed force in a place or places outside the
United States specified by the Secretary of Defense, as follows:
(A) Employees of the Department of Defense.
(B) Employees of any Department of Defense contractor who are so serving
in connection with the performance of a Department of Defense contract.
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Averette, which had held that the phrase "time of war" as used in
paragraph 10 of UCMJ article 2(a) limited the scope of the UCMJ's
jurisdiction over civilians only to times of war formally declared by
Congress. °3
No committee hearings were held on the bill, as is often the case in the
Senate, but the Judiciary Committee nevertheless reported the bill to the
full Senate favorably on June 24, 1999. The bill was amended slightly by
the Judiciary Committee, at the request of Senator Patrick Leahy, a
Democrat from Vermont and the ranking minority member on the
committee. Senator Leahy's amendment made three small substantive
changes to the bill.20 4 The first change required the Secretary of Defense
to consult with the Secretary of State when making the determination as
to which foreign officials can request that an American under arrest for a
violation of the new act be turned over to them for prosecution.2"5 The
second change permitted the exercise of jurisdiction over DoD
employees and contractors accompanying the Armed Forces only during
times when the armed forces are engaged in a 'contingency operation'
involving a war or national emergency declared by the Congress or the
2016President. The final change deleted a provision that would have
deemed the time necessary to return a defendant to the United States
under the act as "justifiable delay., 20
7
While the work of the Judiciary Committee might not have been
significant, the selection of that committee as the committee of
jurisdiction might have been fortuitous. Unlike Senator Inouye's bills,
which had been drafted to amend Title 10 of the United States Code
(which deals with the military) and was therefore referred to the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Senator Sessions' bill amended Title 18, the
Federal criminal code. As a result, the committee of jurisdiction was the
Judiciary Committee, the committee that regularly considers additions to
the nation's criminal law. The Armed Services Committee considers
criminal law issues only when an amendment to the UCMJ is proposed in
an annual authorization bill. On the other hand, the Judiciary
Committee considers criminal law issues as a matter of routine.2 This
203. See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
204. Compare 145 CONG. REC. S8195-97 (daily ed., July 1, 1-999) (as reported by the
Judiciary Committee), with S. 768, 106th Cong. (1999) (as it was introduced in the Senate),
infra, at appendix A.
205. 145 CONG. REC. S8197 (daily ed., July 1, 1999).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. The allocation of legislative jurisdiction over the DoD and the military
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fact might explain why the Sessions bill made it out of committee and to
the full Senate when earlier bills with a similar intent, such as Senator
Inouye's, had not.
The full Senate considered the bill introduced by Sessions on July 1,
1999. By agreement among Senators Sessions, DeWine, and Leahy, the
bill was slightly amended again. 9 One modification to the provision
allowed DoD employees to arrest persons violating the Act in order to
require that arrests be carried out in accordance with any applicable
international agreement.2 '0 Another modification required the Secretary
of Defense to consult with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General when drafting regulations to implement the act.2 ' The Senate
passed the amended bill by unanimous consent.
212
2. Moving to the House
After the bill passed the Senate, Justice and DoD raised concerns
about it. Apparently, because no Senate hearings or committee
deliberations had been held on the bill, DoD and Justice had been caught
off guard when the bill passed the Senate. The principal concern of DoD
and Justice was the provision in the bill that extended court-martial
jurisdiction to civilians "serving with and accompanying" the military
outside the United States in support of a "contingency operation." Of
course, the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee report to
Congress had recommended that such a provision be included in any bill
passed by Congress to address the jurisdictional gap."3 Apparently,
however, that portion of the report had either not been fully considered
within DoD or Justice or changes in senior agency personnel after the
report was issued resulted in a change of opinion as to the utility of this
departments to the House and Senate committees on armed services leaves amendments
to the UCMJ, the military's criminal code for its members, under the control of those
committees while the vast majority of federal criminal law is under the jurisdiction of the
committees on the judiciary. See, e.g., H.R. DOc. No. 106-320, at 413, 419-21, 440-43
(1999).
209. Compare 145 CONG. REC. S8195 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (as reported by the
Judiciary Committee), with S. 768, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. S8196 (daily ed. July 1,
1999) (the Sessions-Leahy-DeWine amendment offered by Senator Slade Gorton); see
also 1.45 CONG. REC. S8197 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Curiously,
while Leahy purported to be describing the changes made by the amendment offered on
the floor the Senate, the amendments he discussed were made by the committee
amendment.
210. 145 CONG. REC. S8196 (daily ed., July 1, 1999).
211. Id.
212. 145 CONG. REC. S8197 (daily ed. July 1, 1999).
213. Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee Report, supra note 32, at 49.
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provision. In any event, both DoD and Justice no longer supported the
UCMJ amendment.
In separate letters to the chairmen of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and to the House Judiciary Committee, DoD and Justice
supported only the federal crime provision of the Sessions bill.21 4  In
addressing the UCMJ provision, DoD General Counsel Judith Miller
wrote to Senator John Warner, "[t]hat portion would raise several issues
of public concern and present constitutional questions that would likely
engender protracted litigation." '215 In noting that the provision would
subject some DoD employees to trial by court-martial and would exclude
(those not stationed overseas) Miller wrote, "[t]he potential for
inconsistency within the departmental civilian workforce would serve to
detract from, rather than enhance, morale and the interests of justice.,
21 6
In a letter to Representative Henry Hyde, Assistant Attorney General
for Legislative Affairs Robert Raben wrote "[i]n our view, this provision
raises substantial constitutional questions concerning the propriety of the
assertion of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians., 21 7 Raben stated "if
section 3 [the UCMJ amendment] were stricken, we would strongly
support the bill., 2' s Raben's statement implied that the Clinton
Administration might oppose the bill if the provision was not removed."9
Shortly after these letters were received, members of the legislative
affairs staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) informed
the legislative affairs staffs of the individual service branches that the bill
would not be a priority to OSD. OSD's message was clear-if the
services wanted this bill they were going to have to make it happen.
Within the Army, the matter fell to Colonel David E. Graham, Chief
of the International and Operational Law Division in the Army Judge
Advocate General's office. After conferring with Brigadier General
214. Letter from Judith A. Miller, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to
Senator John W. Warner, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate
(Sept. 3, 1999); Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative
Affairs, Department of Justice, to Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Committee
on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 19, 1999). Both letters are on file
with the Subcommittee on Crime. The letters expressed the respective views of DoD and
Justice on Senate bill 768 in the form it was first passed by the Senate. Id. In the letters,
both departments opposed enactment of the provision in the bill that would have
extended court-martial jurisdiction over civilians. Id.
215. Letter from Judith A. Miller, supra note 214.
216. Id.
217. Letter from Robert Raben, supra note 214.
218. Id.
219. See id.
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Joseph R. Barnes, who was finishing a tour as the Army's Assistant
Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations, Graham
decided that it was in the Army's interest to try to move the bill.
Graham and Barnes asked Robert Reed, an Associate Deputy General
Counsel at DoD, who was a retired Air Force colonel and who had been
a member of the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee, to help
them move the bill in the House of Representatives. Colonel Graham
asked Major Gregory Baldwin, an officer in the Army's Office of
Congressional and Legislative Liaison, to arrange meetings with the
appropriate subcommittees in the House to discuss the bill. While only
the Senate Judiciary Committee had jurisdiction of the bill in that body,
the House parliamentarians had referred it first to the Armed Services
Committee, with a subsequent referral to the Judiciary Committee. As a
result, both committees would have an opportunity to review, and
possibly amend, the bill.
On October 14, a DoD delegation left the Pentagon to meet with
representatives of both committees. The delegation included Reed,
Barnes, Graham, and Baldwin, together with Graham's counterparts
from the Navy and Air Force-Captain Michael McGregor, the Deputy
Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy for International Law,
and Colonel Michael Schlabs, the Chief of the International and
Operational Law Division of the Air Force Judge Advocate General's
Office. The first meeting was with Edward Wyatt and Debra Wada,
professional staff members of the Armed Services Committee staff. 220
They told the delegation that the committee generally disfavored
changes to the UCMJ and that the UCMJ provision in the Sessions bill
seemed redundant given the new federal crime provision in that bill,
allowing military members to be tried in federal court. After the
meeting, Wyatt briefed Representative Steve Buyer, a Republican from
Indiana, chairman of the committee's Subcommittee on Military
Personnel, and a lawyer in the Army Reserve. Buyer, who had also
served on the Crime Subcommittee in the prior two Congresses, agreed
that the UCMJ provision was unnecessary. With the provision deleted,
the Armed Services Committee had almost no jurisdictional claim to the
bill, and Buyer agreed that the issue was best left to the Judiciary
Committee.
After the meeting with the Armed Services staff, the group then met
with staff members of the Judiciary Committee's Crime Subcommittee-
220. Interview with Edward Wyatt, professional staff member, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 16, 2000).
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Rick Filkins, one of the Republican counsels to the subcommittee and a
former Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), Iden Martyn, a
current AUSA who had been detailed (i.e., loaned) by Justice to the
Democratic staff of the committee, and myself. Barnes again laid out the
problem and discussed the work of the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory
Committee. He then described the Senate bill and the concerns that
DoD and Justice had raised. Our initial impression was favorable and we
told the group that we would speak to Representative Bill McCollum,
the subcommittee's chairman, and to Representative Bobby Scott, the
subcommittee's ranking minority member, about the issue. After the
group left we agreed that the subcommittee should address the issue, but
without the UCMJ amendment. We also wondered why the problem
had been ignored by Congress for so long, especially given that the
answer to the problem seemed easy to achieve.
Filkins and I briefed Representative McCollum. Having served as a
lawyer on active duty in the Navy and, later, in the Naval Reserve for
over twenty years Representative McCollum quickly understood the
problem and approved our recommendation that the subcommittee
address the issue. Representative McCollum also agreed with our
suggestion that the UCMJ provision be dropped. We decided to rewrite
the legislation, dropping the UCMJ reference and addressing other
provisions that Filkins and I thought needed to be changed. The new bill
would be introduced in the House. Representative Saxby Chambliss, a
member of the House Armed Services Committee and a friend of
Senator Sessions, had expressed interest in sheparding the Senate bill
through the House. Sessions had called Chambliss and personally asked
him to help move the Senate bill because he thought having a member of
the House Armed Services Committee support his bill might help ensure
its passage in the House. Despite the fact that the new bill we would
draft would be referred principally to the Judiciary Committee and
would require McCollum's effort to move it through the committee,
McCollum agreed to allow Chambliss to introduce it as the sponsor, with
McCollum as the original co-sponsor.
3. Drafting the House Bill
Filkins and I began drafting the House bill. Major Baldwin gave us a
draft that DoD preferred to the Senate bill. The draft incorporated
many of the amendments made to the Sessions bill in the Senate.
Pursuant to our usual practice when an executive branch agency supplied
us with draft language we used that draft as a guide, but decided to
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rewrite most of the important provisions of the bill.22" '
First, we dropped the UCMJ amendment proposed in the Senate bill.
We also deleted its congressional findings. While the Senate often
incorporates findings into a bill to explain why it acts on it, the House
generally does not do the same. Congressional findings do not actually
become part of the law, and members often get bogged down in debating
the findings rather than the substantive portions of the bill. This problem
quickly proves unworkable in the House because it consists of many
more members than the Senate. We also planned to hold a hearing on
the bill where witnesses would testify as to the need for the bill and
would lay any factual foundation for the bill.
We rewrote the key provision in the act, section 3261, the provision
that would actually state the offense, in order to make it more consistent
with the style of most Title 18 sections. Rather than taking the Senate
approach of listing the people to whom the offense would apply, we
reordered the provision to state the prohibited conduct first. Also, while
the Senate bill applied the new crime to all military members, DoD
wanted its reach limited to members who had committed the crime while
in service, but who were no longer subject to the UCMJ. In most cases,
common law crimes committed by military personnel in the United
States violate both the UCMJ and federal criminal laws. Disputes as to
who will prosecute the common law cases have to be worked out
between DoD and Justice officials. 222 In asking us to limit the reach of
the new provision, DoD was attempting to write into the statute a
preference for UCMJ prosecutions by DoD if the crime occurred outside
the United States. This preference seemed acceptable to us at the time
we drafted the provision and so we used DoD's proposed language.
In both the Senate bill and the DoD draft, section 3261 ended with the
words "shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment," a
phrase used in many of the earlier bills introduced to close the gap.
Filkins and I thought this language was too vague. Toby Dorsey, from
221. We sat down with Toby Dorsey of the House's Office of Legislative Counsel to
rework the bill. The lawyers in that office are nonpartisan experts on the rules of
legislative drafting and use special software to print bills in their peculiar format and text.
More important to our work, however, each lawyer also has developed an expertise in one
or more areas of substantive law and are a valuable resource to members and staff
working on legislation.
222. See, e.g., DoD Directive 5525.7, Implementation of the Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense
Relating to the Investigation and Prosecution of Certain Crimes (1985), in MCM, supra
note 8, at A3-1.
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the House Legislative Counsel's Office, helped us redraft the bill 223 and
pointed out that while similar language appeared in two other places in
Title 18, almost all federal criminal statutes were constructed in the form:
"whoever, does a specific bad thing, shall be punished. 2 24  The
conclusion "shall be guilty of a crime" was used only in those two
225
statutes . In rewriting this section, we found it difficult to state the
punishment for a violation of section 3261 since the punishments would
vary depending on the act committed. Listing all of the possible
punishments was impracticable, but mandating just one maximum
punishment would have left too much discretion to the SentencingC • • 226
Commission. Because the statute merely cross-referenced the
prohibited conduct by reference to other statutes ("would constitute an
offense... if [it] had been engaged in within.., the United States"), we
decided to simply cross-reference the punishment as "shall be punished
as provided for that offense.,
227
The only other change we made in section 3261 was in the subsection
allowing military officials to deliver a defendant to civilian officials.
The Senate bill had used the phrase "released," but we were concerned
that someone might have misinterpreted this to mean that the defendant
had to be formally released by military officials and allowed to walk out
the door before he could be handed over to the civilian authorities. We
changed the term to "delivered" (to emphasize the continuous nature of
the custody) and added the requirement that the delivery be made "as
soon as practicable." Mindful that some of the members of our
subcommittee might have concerns about allowing the military to arrest
and detain civilians, Filkins and I thought it was important to clarify the
223. See supra note 221.
224. 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (2000); Id. § 1 t66.
225. Much later we focused on one of the two statutes. The Federal Assimilative
Crimes Act allows for federal prosecution, in essence, for committing certain state crimes
(such as gambling laws and child abuser reporting statute) on federal property (such as
military bases) if there is no federal statute that governs the situation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 13
(2000). See infra notes 277-278 and accompanying text. The other statute that Dorsey
noted, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1166 (2000), is similar. It applies state gambling laws to any Indian
country in that state.
226. The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency of the
Judicial Branch, created by Congress, whose purpose is to establish sentencing policies
and practices for the federal criminal justice system. It determines ranges of sentences,
under the maximum punishments established by Congress in each federal criminal statue,
that judges use when determining the sentence to be imposed on a person convicted of
committing a federal crime. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. V 2000).
227. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3261(a) (2001).
228. Id. § 3263.
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language of the statute that the military's detention of a civilian was to
last only as long as absolutely necessary.
We used DoD's proposed language for section 3262. In section 3263,
we deleted the requirement that notice of the new act be given to non-
nationals serving with the military. While we saw the wisdom in giving
notice to foreign civilians employed by or accompanying the military, as
there would be no reason for them to know that American law might
apply to them, there was less of a reason to require that the same notice
be given to non-nationals actually serving in the military. All of them
would have received instruction in the UCMJ as part of their military
training and thus would be aware that our government, through the
military, would prosecute them for misconduct. The remote possibility
that those non-nationals serving might be prosecuted under the new act
was not enough to require formal notice. Requiring this notice to be
given to the one or two soldiers in a unit who were not American citizens
might also create confusion or even resentment among other troops in
the unit.
We added a requirement that the Secretary of Defense consult with
the Attorney General when drafting the regulations designed to give
notice of the new act to foreign nationals. The Senate bill required the
Secretary of Defense to consult only with the Secretary of State.229
Because we were venturing into new legal territory by authorizing
American law to apply to non-Americans outside the United States, we
thought it made sense for the country's chief legal officer also to have a
say in developing the notice provision.
In section 3264, we made a cosmetic change by reordering the
definitions of "employed by the Armed Forces" and "accompanying the
Armed Forces" to read in the same order as they are mentioned in
section 3261. Also, DoD requested that we modify our draft to clarify
that the new statute would apply to both nonappropriated fund
instrumentality employees as well as DoD subcontractors "at any tier."
At first, we were hesitant to apply the new statute to subcontractors
several levels below the actual DoD contractor because those persons
might have only a slight relationship to the U.S. military. However, the
bill expressly did not apply to nationals of the host country and it was
likely that most third party subcontractors would be in that country in
order to work on the DoD contract, therefore we felt there was sufficient
justification to bring them within the scope of the bill.
Finally, we added a new subsection to the bill to require that all
229. S. 768, 106th Cong. (1999).
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regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Defense to implement the
bill be submitted to Congress before they took effect. The act would be a
major change in the applicability of American criminal law. Bobby
Vassar, minority counsel to the Subcommittee, and I both felt strongly
that we should use the committee's oversight power to make sure that
DoD's regulations, which unlike most executive branch regulations are
not subject to the public review and comment process,230 were consistent
with the intent of the Act. In addition, I decided that the Act should
require DoD to submit its draft regulations to the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees specifically and also prevent the regulations from
going into effect for ninety days after they are submitted. That way
Congress would have time to act, informally at the staff level or formally
though another statute (if DoD fought any staff recommendations to
change the draft), to prevent the regulations from going into effect if it
thought they were ill advised. We further drafted the provision to
require any future amendments to the regulations also be submitted to
Congress for a ninety-day review period. Much to my surprise, DoD did
not balk at the requirement.
Representative Chambliss introduced the completed bill in the House
on November 16, 1999, as House bill 3380.231 The House bill was referred
to the Judiciary Committee, with a subsequent referral to the Armed
Services Committee. Both committees had an opportunity to amend the
bill, but with the UCMJ provision of the Senate bill deleted, the Judiciary
Committee had the stronger claim to control the bill and received the
principal referral .232
4. The House Hearing
Congress soon adjourned for the end of the first session of the 106th
230. The requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act do not apply to military
or foreign affairs functions. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). Nevertheless, DoD may choose to seek
public comment on the regulations that implement the Military Exterritorial Jurisdiction
Act. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. 310-4, Publication in the Federal Register of
Rules Affecting the Public § 2-2 (July 22, 1977) (requiring that some Army regulations be
published in the Federal Register). For example, regulations that concern the procedures
by which the Army conducts its business with the public and substantive rules applicable
to the public as authorized by law. This type of regulation requires that public comment
be sought on any published regulation that has a substantial and direct impact on the
public or any significant portion of the public. Id. at § 3-2.
231. H.R. 3380, 1061h Cong. (1999). A copy of House bill 3380 as it was originally
introduced in the House can be found, infra, at appendix B.
232. We later learned that the House parliamentarian also referred the bill to the
Armed Services Committee because the bill required the Secretary of Defense to
promulgate regulations to implement it.
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Congress and, in keeping with tradition, returned to work for the State of
the Union address in late January. Representative Scott, the Crime
Subcommittee's ranking minority member, was a stickler for the "regular
order" and had indicated his strong preference to McCollum at the
beginning of the Congress that the Subcommittee hold a hearing on any
bill on which McCollum planned to take action. I recommended to
McCollum that we hold a hearing on House bill 3380 in late March.
I requested that DoD propose several witnesses to discuss different
aspects of the bill. When DoD speaks on issues of policy a civilian
appointee usually testifies and Reed was selected to be the chief DoD
spokesperson. Baldwin proposed that Barnes also testify to give a legal
review of the issue and to discuss its impact on military readiness.
Baldwin also suggested that DoD fly in a base commander from
overseas who could speak to how the jurisdictional gap impacted the
administration of a military facility. Brigadier General James B. Smith,
the commander of the Air Force's Eighth Fighter Wing located at
Kadena Air Base in Japan, was selected to make the long trip to
Washington. Justice proposed sending Roger Pauley, a long-serving
career lawyer in Washington and Director for Legislation in the Office of
Policy and Legislation of the Criminal Division to testify on its behalf.
As the date of the hearing drew nearer, Vassar called to tell me that he
had been contacted by representatives of the Federal Education
Association (FEA), the union that represents teachers who work in the
schools run by DoD. The FEA expressed very strong concerns about the
bill and wanted to testify at the hearing. Vassar indicated that
Representative Scott supported the request and we planned to allow the
FEA to testify at the hearing. I had hoped that the hearing would be a
formality to satisfy Representative Scott's insistence on the regular order
and that the bill would sail smoothly through the Committee. Little did I
know that Vassar's call meant that most of our work on the bill lay ahead
of us.
The hearing went well, but only two members of the Subcommittee
attended, Representative Scott and Representative Steve Chabot, a
Republican from Ohio. Representative McCollum had previously
decided to run for the open Senate seat in Florida and had begun to miss
subcommittee hearings that promised to be non-controversial in order to
have more time to campaign. Representative Chabot presided instead
and read a statement into the record that I had written for
Representative McCollum. Reed, Barnes, and Smith testified as we
expected, and stressed the impact of the gap on morale, good order, and
discipline. Pauley presented Justice's view of the legal ramifications of
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the gap and how it could best be closed.
Jan Mohr, the president of the FEA testified on behalf of the FEA, as
well as for the National Education Association (NEA), perhaps the
largest teacher's union in the country. While Mohr stated that the FEA
and NEA supported the intent of the bill, she asserted that it "lack[ed]
sufficient due process provisions to protect civilians accused of crimes
overseas." 233 Mohr questioned which military authorities would arrest
civilians under the bill, whether military authorities would interpret the
bill as allowing them to hold civilians in custody without approval from
Justice whether defendants would be given access to counsel and
opportunity to provide bail, and asserted that military authorities might
arrest and detain a civilian without conducting any real investigation into
allegations made against the person.3  In support of her concerns, Mohr
mentioned two incidents where she believed military authorities had
overreached in investigating DoD teachers. Mohr concluded by asking
the subcommittee members to amend the bill to require "full and fair
investigations," to allow defendants to post bail, to obtain "release from
pre-trail [sic] confinement" and to specifically provide for a right to legal
counsel .236
Of course, we had no intention of allowing the military to ride
roughshod over defendants under the bill, as Mohr had asserted. The
right to counsel, bail, and a speedy trial were long-settled under existing
statues and rules, not to mention the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution. It was clear that Mohr did not understand the protections
already in the law, and sometimes a misinformed opponent is harder to
overcome than one who simply disagrees with you. I began to worry that
the smooth sailing through the House that we had hoped for this bill
might not happen.
5. The Subcommittee Markup
The next step in our process was to hold a markup of the legislation in
the Crime Subcommittee. Markup sessions are where bills are formally
amended and voted on by the members of a subcommittee or committee.
Because Congress was not in session for the Passover/Easter holiday
during the last two weeks of April, we tentatively set the markup for May
3 and began considering what changes we would make to the bill.
233. Hearings, supra note 133, at 27 (statement of Mohr).
234. Id. at 27 (statement of Mohr).
235. Id. at 27-28 (statement of Mohr).
236. Id. at 28 (statement of Mohr).
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I had Filkins broach the subject of a post-arrest, overseas hearing with
Pauley. He was strongly opposed to any amendment in the statute to
accommodate the FEA; he simply did not think any fix was needed.
Pauley pointed out that other statutes had extraterritorial reach and that
the government had used them in the past with no problem. He also
questioned the wisdom of drafting a special provision that would apply
only to our new statute and not to other statutes. He recommended that
we simply direct our concerns to the Judicial Conference. The Judicial
Conference is a group of federal judges who propose changes to the
various sets of court rules. Pauley thought the Judicial Conference could
study whether any additional procedures should be implemented with
respect to all of the extraterritorial statutes, including the new one to be
enacted by the bill. He also opposed adding any provision to the bill to
delay its effective date, he was concerned that another Gatlin-like result
might occur in the interim.
By this time, Justice realized that the bill gave DoD the exclusive right
to try its members under the UCMJ for crimes they committed outside
the United States. Pauley opposed this and argued that when a crime
involved both a military member and a civilian the government might
prefer to try them together in a federal court. As drafted, the bill, using
DoD's language, did not permit the government to try a military member
in federal court because the military member's act would not be a crime
under the statute, but only under the UCMJ. Pauley proposed that we
broaden the bill to make a military member's act a crime but to allow a
joint trial only if the military member was indicted along with a civilian
and then only if a judge concluded that a joint trial was appropriate.
Dorsey pointed out the shortcoming of writing a statute that made an act
a crime only in the event that a judge, after the fact, made a decision
about the expediency of the trial of the accused. Dorsey suggested that
the new statute apply to all military members in order to make the acts
crimes but also suggested a separate section that would limit the
prosecution of active military members to instances where they were
indicted with a civilian and where the judge determined that a joint trial
was appropriate.237
Congress recessed early on May 3, forcing us to postpone the markup
to May 11, in order to ensure that enough members would be present to
markup the bill."' Vassar was not making much headway with the FEA,
237. The standard applied is set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.
238. Unlike the hearing, where only two members had to be present, the Judiciary
Committee rules required that a majority of the thirteen members of the subcommittee be
present in order to amend and then to report a bill to the full committee. House Comm.
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but I decided to recommend that McCollum proceed with the markup
anyway, even without FEA support. I assured Vassar that we would
continue to work with him but that we would probably have to leave
FEA's issues for the full committee markup in order to keep the bill on
schedule to be enacted. Vassar understood and he agreed to advise
Representative Scott to support the bill at this point, despite the lack of
any provision to address the FEA's concerns.
On the May 11, we amended the bill slightly, adding language to
section 3261 so that it would apply to military members if they were
indicted with at least one civilian. I decided to omit the provision Pauley
wanted that would have allowed a judge to determine whether a joint
trial was appropriate. Instead, I left that decision to be governed by
existing rules on separation of witnesses. This meant, however, that it
would be possible for a military member to be prosecuted alone in
federal court if a judge granted a motion for separate trials. This
alteration seemed a low risk compared to the benefit of not having the
statute cluttered with procedural language. Additionally, we deleted a
reference, in the definition section of the bill, to employees of "a military
department," since they were DoD employees and the additional
language was redundant. Finally, we put the requirement that the
Secretary of Defense submit his implementing regulations to Congress
into the text of the new statute so that this provision would become part
of the enacted statute.
6. Addressing the Objections of the FEA
After the hearing, Vassar and Martyn continued to have discussions
with the FEA, the NEA, and the American Federation of Teachers,
which had taken an interest in the bill. The FEA representatives
presented Vassar and Martyn with a long list of amendments the group
wanted made to the bill. Among the suggested amendments was a
special procedure for cases of alleged child abuse by a DoD teacher that
required a special review of the allegations before charges could be filed
or any arrest be made. FEA also proposed the creation of an overseas
magistrate program using military judges. These judges would hold
probable cause and detention hearings in cases brought pursuant to the
bill and would determine when arrest warrants should be issued.
Further, FEA proposed amending the bill to, in essence, codify certain
constitutional rights, including a right to receive a Miranda warning, the
right to an appearance before a military magistrate within forty-eight
on the Judiciary, Rules of Procedure II(g) (1999).
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hours of arrest, the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right to a
speedy trial, the right to representation by a military attorney, and the
right to have the government pay for all costs of transporting defendants
to and from trial.
Most of the suggested amendments were unreasonable or
unnecessary. As a matter of legislative drafting, constitutional rights are
never included in statutory language for the simple reason that the
Constitution always supercedes any statute that is inconsistent with it,
and further reciting constitutional rights in a statute is unnecessary. In
addition, some of the language that FEA requested involving "Miranda
rights," the right of appearance, and the right to a speedy trial, were
broader than the current law in these areas. We did not know if the
FEA's proposed language was an attempt to enlarge these procedures or
whether it was evidence that they were not familiar with the procedures
in the first place. In any event, we were concerned that using the
language proposed by the FEA would conflict with the long-held practice
of having one uniform set of procedures that applies to all federal
criminal prosecutions.
Martyn suggested a meeting between the DoD representatives,"' the
teachers, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in an effort to
clear the air. Martyn scheduled the meeting for May 5 and invited
Filkins and me to attend. The meeting did not go well. The teachers
expressed a great deal of distrust in the government, in general, and
seemed convinced that DoD and Justice would make only a cursory
investigation of any allegations against DoD teachers before arresting
240them and forcibly returning them to the United States. Colonel
239. Reed, Graham, and Baldwin were regularly accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel
Ronald Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Denise Lind, both of whom were lawyers working
for Graham in the Office of The Judge Advocate General. The group traveled to Capitol
Hill together for meetings on the bill so often that Baldwin began referring to them as "the
usual suspects." Each of these officers provided invaluable legal and military expertise as
we crafted the legislation.
240. Recent events in the Washington area just before the subcommittee hearing on the
bill may have influenced the position of the teachers and ACLU representatives during
the meeting. Two weeks before the March 30 hearing, seven grade school students in a
Maryland county that bordered Washington had admitted that allegations of sexual abuse
they had made against a local teacher were false. Brigid Schulte & Michael E. Ruane,
Sixth-Graders Who Accused Teacher of Fondling Charged in Hoax, WASH. POST, Mar 14,
2000, at Al. The story of the alleged abuse had received a good deal of coverage in the
local newspapers and on television. During the May 5 meeting, the teachers raised the
specter that American students in DoD schools abroad might also make false allegations
against their teachers and that the military would use the Act to remove the accused from
the country to the United States before the truth about the students= false claims could be
discovered. I sensed that this was why FEA president Mohr had requested, at the hearing,
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Graham assured the teachers that this would not be DoD's practice.
Graham pointed out that DoD would not benefit from arresting one of
its employees on an allegation only to have the case dismissed once the
defendant was brought before a judge in the United States. Graham
noted that such a practice would have a negative impact on the
relationship between DoD and its teacher employees. The teachers
seemed unconvinced. I offered to use the committee report on the bill to
state the committee's intent that all constitutional protections enjoyed by
persons in the United States were to apply to any proceedings under the
Act, but that did not seem to give the teacher much comfort either. The
meeting concluded with no resolution.
After the meeting, Vassar, Martyn, Filkins, and I continued to discuss
the bill. We agreed that the constitutional rights language the teachers
wanted would not be included. However, we did agree that the teachers
had a valid concern regarding a defendant's responsibility to bear the
cost of a return trip to his or her home after being removed to the United
States for some proceeding short of the trial in their case (i.e. an initial
appearance or a detention hearing) that did have merit. But, we ruled
out the option of having the government bear the cost, because the
government did not pay a defendant's travel costs in any other situation.
We noted that the teachers seemed to see the moment of indictment as
a bright line, the point where they were satisfied that sufficient
investigation had been done, probable cause had been ascertained by the
government, and a defendant could be forced to return to the United
States. We considered allowing defendants under the new statute to
remain in the country where they lived until the time of indictment. The
problem, however, was ensuring that the preliminary hearing required by
case law24' and federal rules242 could still take place.243 We considered
giving the defendant the option to remain overseas and require him to
waive his right to any preliminary or detention hearing. However, we
thought that the teachers might argue that this was too great a price to
that a long list of procedural protections be placed in the bill.
241. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 105 n.1, 114 (1975) (requiring that persons
arrested without a warrant must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a
judicial determination of probable cause); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 56 (1991) (explaining that "judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours
of arrest will ... comply with the promptness requirements of Gerstein").
242. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (providing that an arrested person is to be taken "without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate").
243. While we did not know it at the time, this problem had been noted by other
commentators reviewing prior legislation to close the jurisdictional gap. See Becker, supra
note 46, at 292-93; Gibson, supra note 51, at 165-66.
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pay for wanting to stay close to one's home pending a full investigation
by the government.
Another option we considered was to allow the preliminary hearing to
take place by video teleconference or by telephone. I called the
Administrative Office of United States Courts, the administrative arm of
the judicial branch, and asked to find a member of the Judges'
Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to speak with me
244
on this point. John Rabiej, the chief of the Rules Committee Support
Office, told me that the Committee on Criminal Rules had been
considering whether to allow initial appearances to be conducted by
video teleconference. Rabiej said that video teleconferencing had been
used effectively in immigration proceedings involving illegal aliens who
were incarcerated for a crime or detained pending deportation and that
several states conducted initial appearances in that manner. In fact,
because of these examples, the Criminal Rules Committee was in the
process of considering amending Rule 5 to allow video teleconferencing
in federal criminal cases. The proposed amendment would have allowed
the judge to use video teleconferencing to conduct the appearance if the
defendant waived "the right to be present," while an alternative option
would have simply given the judge the discretion to decide whether to
use it.
Rabiej was not sure if video teleconferencing was available to all
judges at that time, and we could not be certain that DoD's video
teleconference system and any system that the judges might later put in
place would be compatible. So, we were left to consider whether the bill
245
should mandate a telephonic appearance. Under Gerstein v. Pugh,
defendants do not have the right to confront witnesses at the initial246
appearance. Therefore, the ability of a defendant or the judge to
actually see witnesses at the initial proceeding does not have a
constitutional dimension. We thought that the teacher's concerns could
be addressed by allowing the initial appearance to be conducted by
telephone. Pauley reluctantly agreed to draft language he thought might
accomplish this goal.
I asked Toby Dorsey, from the Legislative Counsel's office, to use
Pauley's proposal as a starting point in drafting a provision that would
244. The Judges' Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is one of the
groups of judges that proposes changes in the various sets of federal rules to the Chief
Justice of the United States, who then proposes them to Congress where they
automatically become operative unless Congress acts to prevent the proposed changes.
245. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
246. 1d. at 126.
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allow a defendant to remain outside the United States until he or she was
indicted and would provide for the initial appearance in the case to be
conducted by telephone. Dorsey's draft incorporated Pauley's idea to
require the defendant to decide, within forty-eight hours of being
arrested, whether he or she wished to remain outside the United States
and also would have required that the defendant be informed of his or
her right to make such an election. The proposal would also have
provided that defendants making the election would waive any right to a
preliminary examination and that, if a telephone hearing was held, it
would not have any effect on the venue for the defendant's trial.247
Additionally, the draft required the judge to determine whether probable
cause existed for the government to have arrested the defendant.
Dorsey's draft also included two other provisions I had requested.
One would have allowed a judge to appoint military counsel to represent
an indigent defendant. Although DoD had informed us that there were
often civilian counsel available near military bases in foreign countries,
including some American lawyers, I was concerned about situations
where the defendant could not afford a lawyer. The second provision
was a limitation on the prohibition against removing the defendant from
the place where he or she was arrested. This limitation would permit the
government to move the defendant if military necessity required it. The
provision seemed necessary because DoD had expressed concern about
being forced to hold an arrested civilian (most likely a civilian employee
or contractor) in a dangerous area.
Because Dorsey's draft was a preliminary draft, we did not send it to
outside parties. Filkins and I were not entirely satisfied with the
approach that Pauley had proposed and that Dorsey had drafted. For
example, DoD had asked us who we envisioned would advise defendants
of their right to remain in the place where they were arrested. Although
some consideration was given to allowing a military magistrate to inform
defendants of their right to remain where they were arrested, I did not
like the idea of authorizing military judges to have criminal jurisdiction
over civilians. In addition, there is a lack of uniformity among the
various services as to who can serve as magistrates, and I could imagine
the specter of appellate litigation looming in these cases about whether
the defendant had been properly advised of his or her rights.
While we were considering these issues, Pauley proposed a different
approach. He suggested that the telephone hearing be automatic and
that a Federal judge give the defendant notice of his right to remain in
247. See infra note 349 and accompanying text.
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the foreign country. I still did not like the idea of a formal election
process and feared that with each new proposal on this issue we were
turning a relatively simple proceeding into a very convoluted one.
Although I thought Pauley's suggestion to hold the initial appearance by
telephone in every case was a good one, I was concerned about forcing
judges to hold such a hearing by telephone if the defendant objected.
After all, although the teachers were adamantly opposed to allowing the
government to force defendants to return to the United States prior to
formal indictment, some defendants might actually prefer to appear
before a judge in person rather than being held on a military base. I did
not want to preclude that possibility.
I decided to rewrite the entire section. My draft simply prohibited the
government from removing the defendant until he or she was indicted or
until an information was filed against them.248 The draft allowed, but did
not require, the telephonic hearing. When coupled with the prohibition
on removal, however, the telephonic hearing provision had the practical
effect of giving the defendant a choice of whether to stay in the foreign
country, without requiring any formal notice and election, or returning to
the United States. Most defendants probably would prefer to remain
where they were. If a defendant objected to the telephone appearance,
however, he could simply communicate this to the judge (through
counsel before the hearing or even at the beginning of a telephonic
hearing) and the judge could adjourn the proceeding until the defendant
was brought to the United States. I also removed the automatic waiver
of the right to a preliminary examination as I felt this was too extreme,
but I provided that if the defendant was entitled to such an examination,
he or she would have to be physically present in the United States for it
to occur. Because a preliminary examination is only held if the
defendant insists on it z49 it did not seem unreasonable to require the
defendant to come to the United States to attend the examination.
Additionally, at the preliminary examination a defendant has the right to
call witnesses and to confront adverse witnesses, which could not, as a
practical matter, be done by telephone.
Finally, I deleted the provision that allowed the judge to appoint
military counsel for the defendant because DoD had not been very
receptive to this provision during our discussions. I believed that the
teachers would not push for this provision because they would be able to
248. An information serves like the filing of an indictment and provides a protection to
a defendant.
249. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.
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afford counsel, since they had income. Moreover, even if counsel were
not available in a foreign country, the teachers could hire lawyers in
America who could participate in the pre-trial proceedings by telephone.
Of course this approval required that indigent defendants return to the
United States to receive appointed military counsel. This result was not
the best outcome, but I knew that deleting the provision allowing the
judge to appoint counsel would make DoD more comfortable with the
removal prohibition itself. I asked Dorsey to incorporate my rewrite into
the larger amendment that McCollum would offer at the full committee
markup of the bill. He sent it to me on June 12 and we distributed this
draft to Vassar, DoD, and Justice the following day.
7. The June 12 Draft
After reviewing it for a few days, Pauley faxed a memo to Dorsey and
me expressing strong concern with the draft. Pauley pointed out that as
written, I had eliminated the possibility that a defendant who requested a
detention hearing under section 3142 of Title 18 could be returned to the
United States for that hearing. Pauley argued that the Supreme Court
had only upheld that statute because of its procedural safeguards,
including the right to call witnesses at a hearing on the issue of detention.
Pauley was concerned that my draft effectively eliminated that
possibility. Additionally, Pauley noted that, under the existing statute, if
the defendant was ordered to be held in custody, he or she was to be held
by the Attorney General (i.e. not by DoD). Pauley was correct, my draft
did not allow for either the detention hearing or custody by the Attorney
General. In our haste to try to forge a compromise on this issue, I had
simply forgotten about the detention hearing issue and Filkins had not
caught it either.
Pauley also suggested that my draft was "schizophrenic" with regard to
the preliminary examination-on the one hand the draft required the
defendant to be physically present for the examination but on the other
hand, it prevented forcing a defendant to return to attend the
examination. In drafting the provision, I had intended that if the
defendant sought the hearing, then he would waive his right to remain
outside the country, but apparently I had not made this provision clear. I
knew that the FEA could not make a strong argument that a defendant
who wanted to avail himself of his right to a preliminary examination,
which would be adversarial, should also be permitted to remain outside
250. A copy of the amendment distributed on June 13 can be found, infra, at appendix
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of the United States. However, the solution was not as simple with
respect to the detention hearing. The detention hearing is mandatory in
some cases if the prosecution moves for one and is permissible in other
cases if the prosecution petitions the court. I knew the FEA would
complain that prosecutors would simply use these provisions to
circumvent the prohibition on requiring the defendant's return to the
United States. The FEA's distrust of the government seemed to be
limited to only prosecutors, however, and not to judges. Therefore, we
decided to give the judge the discretion to order the detention hearing to
be conducted by telephone.
While we were discussing this draft, Baldwin stopped by my office to
tell me about the Gatlin decision, which had been decided only a few
days before."' I was amazed at the coincidence - an appellate court case,
exactly on point, decided in the middle of the debate on a bill that would
have changed the result reached in the case.252 When I saw that the
judge's opinion actually admonished Congress for its failure to close the
jurisdictional gap over the decades and that the judge also stated his
intention to send the opinion to Chairman Hyde for his review, I knew I
had a tool to help push the bill through Congress.
We worked with Dorsey to produce another draft of the amendment
that would be offered at the full committee markup. This draft allowed
both the initial appearance and the detention hearing to be conducted by
telephone. These hearings were addressed in a new subsection entitled
"initial proceedings." We also restructured the subsection on removal to
the United States. This provision now stated the prohibition first, and
then listed a number of events that would modify or terminate the
prohibition (e.g. military necessity, preliminary examination, detention
hearing, indictment). Again, we circulated this draft to DoD and Justice.
Unfortunately, Pauley still was not satisfied. Pauley was concerned
that, under the revised draft, a judge might order the detention hearing
conducted by telephone even if the prosecution and the defense
objected. This seemed unlikely, but Pauley was correct that the language
we used would have permitted such a result. Although Pauley argued
that this right should be deleted, he suggested the bill should at least
incorporate factors that the judge must consider in determining whether
251. United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2000).
252. In his opinion in United States v. Corey, Judge Kozinski suggested that the Gatlin
decision "prodded Congress" to act. United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1172 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2000). This suggestion was simply wrong. We decided, in October 1999, to move the
bill, which was long before we learned about Gatlin. In fact, the Crime Subcommittee's
hearing on the bill and its markup of the bill were held before Gatlin was decided.
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to hold the detention hearing by telephone. Pauley also pointed out that
the detention statute required that defendants be afforded the right to be
represented by counsel and suggested that the bill give judges the right to
appoint military counsel. This was something that I had considered,
rejected, and was trying to avoid returning to, if possible.
By this point, we were only two working days away from the full
committee markup. I was frustrated that nothing we drafted seemed to
be satisfactory to all sides, and I was worried that the FEA's concerns
and Pauley's resistance to them might slow the bill's progress enough
that Congress would adjourn for the year before we could get the bill
through both houses. I asked Dorsey to amend the draft once again, this
time giving the defendant the choice as to whether the detention hearing
would be conducted by telephone."' I relented on the issue of appointed
military counsel and included a provision that allowed the judge to
appoint military counsel for the defendant at the detention hearing. The
appointment power was limited by permitting judges to appoint only
those persons who were certified as judge advocates in the military. I
knew DoD would not be happy about this provision, but I did not see
much of an alternative at this point. We circulated this draft to DoD,
Justice, and Vassar on Friday, June 23. I made it clear to DoD that if it
wanted the jurisdictional gap problem solved, the issue of appointed
counsel would be part of the price it would have to pay for that solution.
By early the next Monday morning, DoD had weighed in on the new
draft. The Judge Advocates General of the three services254 had
expressed "strong objections" to the language allowing federal judges to
appoint their personnel to represent civilians. I expected them to insist
that the provision be deleted, and was prepared to tell them that it could
not be. Curiously enough, however, DoD asked only that the judges'
power of appointment be limited to using a list of military lawyers
designated by the Secretary of Defense. As a result, the services would
253. We gave the defendant the choice of conducting the detention hearing by
telephone by limiting the judge's discretion to conduct the hearing in this manner only to
cases where the defendant requested it. I stopped short of requiring the defendant to
make a formal motion, using the term "request" instead, so that the judge could simply
ask the defendant at the beginning of a hearing if he or she consented to the telephonic
format. If the defendant did not consent, the hearing would terminate and the defendant
would be flown back to the United States. I decided not to include the list of factors urged
by Pauley, as I felt that the judge's discretion had been appropriately limited. I did,
however, agree to include the factors in the committee report on the bill.
254. The Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy. 10 U.S.C. § 5061
(1994). The Judge Advocate General of the Navy, who always is a Navy two-star admiral,
oversees the work of Navy as well as Marine Corps judge advocates. See generally 10
U.S.C. § 5148 (1994).
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still have some control over who was appointed. The request also
seemed to suggest that the services actually intended to specify which
judge advocates should be designated, which I hoped would result in
them selecting only those lawyers with defense training and experience in
handling these cases. I readily agreed to the change. Interestingly
enough, when DoD sent us the language it proposed, DoD, intentionally
or through oversight, suggested that the judges' appointment power be
expanded to all initial proceedings. This would have the effect of
expanding the judges' appointment power to include the initial
appearance. Although the teachers had not focused on guaranteeing
counsel at the initial hearing, I knew that such a broad provision would
help convince the Democrats to support the amendment. So, I included
that aspect of DoD's request as well.
At about six o'clock in the evening, Vassar sent an email to tell me
he was satisfied with the draft and that the FEA and the AFT both would
support it as well. However, he also told me that the ACLU had
expressed new concerns with the draft and that they were planning to call
me to discuss it. Vassar said that he would support any changes that I
might agree to make to appease them, but he could not in good faith,
insist on them as we had met all of the concerns he had raised on the
teachers' behalf. Vassar also warned me, however, that the ACLU
representative might try to convince the teachers to ask for more
changes. When no call came before I left the office that night, however, I
thought that the ACLU might have decided not to push for further
changes in the bill.
8. The Full Committee Markup
The next morning, the full Judiciary Committee was scheduled to
begin two days of markup. Several bills were on the agenda, including
House bill 3380. Congress was to begin a two-week July Fourth
recess/work period the following week. I knew that Congress also
traditionally took a recess for the entire month of August and I was
concerned that if we did not get the bill voted out of Committee on the
June 27, it might not make it out in time to be enacted by both houses of
Congress during that session. In addition, because the month of
September during an election year is usually filled with disputes over the
annual spending bills for the government and because the congressional
leadership had already decided to end the session by October 6, I felt
that we simply had to get the bill to the floor of the House before the
August recess. After that time the bill could become hopelessly bogged
down in the post-recess spending bill debate. In addition, the Senate had
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yet to act on the House bill and so we had to ensure that it passed the
House with some time left for Senate action. To me, the June 27 hearing
was the last clear shot at getting a bill through Congress to close the
jurisdictional gap.
Of course, Filkins and I thought we were in good shape. We had
satisfied all of the teacher groups, and DoD and Justice finally supported
all of the changes we had made in the bill over the last few weeks, even if
only grudgingly. However, as we walked into the Judiciary Committee
hearing room on the morning of the hearing, Pauley caught our eye.
Pauley pointed out that the new sections, the limitation on removal and
initial proceedings sections, each made reference to a person "arrested
for" a violation of new section 3261. Pauley noted that there would be
times when a person had been indicted but never arrested and so, as
written, these sections might not apply to them. This defect would
undermine the entire compromise made with the teachers. While last
minute changes are common in congressional markups, I was more than
a little frustrated that such a seemingly large omission had escaped all of
us. There was not enough time to call Dorsey and have him make the
change in typeset version of the amendment that McCollum would offer,
so we dumped all of the copies of the amendment we had made and hand
wrote the changes on one copy. Filkins and I stood at the copier
ourselves to make the required stack of copies.
As we walked back into the room, arms full, Vassar told us that Rachel
King, one of the ACLU's lawyers in Washington was there to discuss her
problems with our amendment. We walked out into the hall to talk with
her, with the DoD "usual suspects" and Pauley in tow. King had a
problem with one of the exceptions to the prohibition on removal, the
one that allowed the defendant to be forcibly removed to the United
States once he or she was indicted or an information was filed against
him. All along, the teachers had expressed concerns about extreme or
rash actions by DoD and Justice before a person was indicted.
Therefore, the point of indictment was the bright line in our minds.
After that, all bets were off and all of the special provisions we had
crafted into the bill to address the FEA's concerns would end. But King
had a different take on the issue. She pointed out that nothing in the bill
prevented DoD from removing a defendant to the United States once
the person was indicted, even if DoD had agreed to allow the person to
remain free on his or her own recognizance or if a judge had granted bail
to the defendant. King feared that DoD might simply make it a policy to
send all defendants back to the United States once they had been
indicted. While I told King that her fears seemed extreme, I knew that if
2001]
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she raised enough concerns with the Democratic members of the
committee they might attempt to delay the markup of the bill.
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde had scheduled a long list of bills to be
marked up that day, and if he thought ours was getting bogged down in
last minute debate or modification I knew he might simply put it off to
another day. And I feared that if Chairman Hyde delayed the markup,
the bill might never make it to the House floor in time to be enacted
during the session.
Deleting the provision King disliked posed a different problem,
however. That provision ended the prohibition on the government's
ability to forcibly remove the defendant to the United States. Without it,
there technically would be no end to the prohibition-even for the
purpose of bringing a defendant to the United States for trial. Of course,
while a judge could simply order the defendant to appear for trial (and
would find him or her guilty if they failed to appear), the government
would still have been required to release a defendant in order for him or
her to attend the trial. This would have posed a serious problem in the
case of dangerous defendants who the judge had ordered held until trial.
It was clear that simply deleting the provision was not sufficient.
However, as Pauley, Reed, and I discussed the problem, I realized that
we had been focusing on the wrong event all along. The moment of
indictment did not have any real significance, since that event did not
require the defendant to be in the United States. The defendant's
presence was required at the trial and any pre-trial hearings. Because a
defendant would only remain in the government's custody if the judge
had affirmatively ordered it, I realized that simply giving the judge the
authority to order the defendant's return to the United States would
ensure that the defendant would be present whenever he or she was
needed for trial. It also meant that the bill would not have to list all of
the possible types of hearings that might require the defendant to be
physically present in the courtroom. Reed and Pauley agreed with me,
and I pitched the idea to King. She agreed and we made another
handwritten change to the amendment that McCollum would offer. We
deleted the provision ending the prohibition on return at the moment of
indictment and, instead, provided that the prohibition ended if a judge
ordered the defendant returned to the United States.
McCollum offered the amendment, Scott spoke in favor of it, and the
committee passed it by a voice vote. We were on track to get the bill
through the House and Senate before the end of the Congress.
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9. The House Committee Report
Whenever the Judiciary Committee reports a bill to the full House of
Representatives, it files a report on the bill. 255 Reports describe the need
for the legislation, any background for the development of the bill, and
the dates of any hearings and markups of the bill. Most importantly,
reports contain a detailed section-by-section analysis of a bill. It is here
that the committee can describe in greater detail what its intent was in
drafting the bill and exactly how each section should be interpreted.256
I took the unusual step of sending a draft of the report to DoD and
Pauley for their review and comment. Pauley had previously asked me
to include several items in the report. Specifically, Pauley asked that the
report express a preference that the initial proceedings be conducted by
video teleconferencing, so I added a sentence to the report to express this
preference.257 While we both would have preferred to have enacted this
preference into the bill, we knew that facilities for the use of video would
not always be available, and we did not want the lack of them to cause an
issue for appeal of a conviction. However, Pauley and I did not want the
fact that the telephone was permitted in one situation to undermine the
future use of video in other cases. I also included Pauley's list of factors
that judges were to consider in determining whether to conduct any
detention hearing by telephone or video.2 8 I was not convinced that such
a list was necessary and was not too keen on telling judges what they
needed to consider in exercising their judicial discretion, but I had
promised Pauley to include it. I made it clear in the report that the list
was not exhaustive and that the committee was suggesting rather than
intending that the factors be considered.25 9 Pauley did not object to the
softer language.
Finally, Pauley and DoD had wanted me to include a definition of
"federal magistrate judge" in the text of the bill. I resisted, in part
255. This is the procedure even when a bill is considered under suspension of the rules,
which is a process where non-controversial bills are considered without any formal rule
being issued by the Committee on Rules to govern the debate of the bill on the floor of the
House. See infra note 265. In such a case, the requirement that the committee of
jurisdiction file a report on the bill is waived yet the Judiciary Committee's tradition was
to file a report anyway. Id.
256. Reports are usually written entirely by staff. I have always been amazed that the
power to write "It is the Committee's intent" that a bill be interpreted in a particular way,
is left to the unelected staff members.
257. H.R. REP. No. 106-788, pt. 1, at 19 (2000) [hereinafter House Report].
258. Pauley had wanted these factors included in the statute itself. See supra note 253
and accompanying text.
259. House Report, supra note 257, at 20.
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because I did not think the term needed to be defined in the bill since it
was defined in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and because I
did not want to cross reference a statute to a rule. It was a small matter,
but the distinction between statutes, which are acts of Congress, and
court rules,6 was important to Filkins and me (although probably not to
anyone else), and I was determined to respect it. Therefore, I added a
footnote to state simply that the term was to be given its meaning in the
rule.26'
After making a few other minor changes suggested by Pauley and
DoD, we filed the report on July 20 as House Report 106-778, Part 1.262
The bill was now ready to be voted on by the full House of
Representatives.
10. Floor Consideration
Shortly before the bill was scheduled to come up for a vote of the full
House, Ed Hadden, Senator Sessions' new counsel on the Senate
Judiciary Committee, called and asked if Filkins and I would meet with
him and another member of Sessions' staff in our offices. Their
willingness to come to the House side of Capitol Hill could only mean
that they were looking for a favor from us. Most likely they would
request that we agree to allow the Senate bill number to appear on the
final version of the bill that would be presented to the President for his
261
approval.
Hadden asked us to allow the Senate bill to move - with our text
substituted for theirs. He pointed out that Sessions had introduced the
260. Court rules implement statutes and are made by the judicial branch at the
delegation of the legislative branch.
261. House Report, supra note 257, at 18 n.32.
262. The usual practice when a bill is referred to more than one committee is that each
committee's report on the bill becomes a "part" of one report. As it turned out, although
the bill had also been referred to the Armed Services Committee, they took no action on
it, and so did not file a report. As a result, the House Report is listed as "Part 1," even
though there are no other parts.
263. Whenever there are two versions of a bill that moves through Congress with
different bill numbers, at some point a decision must be made as to which bill number will
go forward. The stakes can be big - if a member can point to a bill that he or she
introduced, and which became law, he or she can claim credit for all of the good done by
the bill. A member who introduced only a companion bill in the other chamber of the
Congress has a much harder time getting credit for his or her work on the legislation, even
if it was significant. Sometimes the decision as to which chamber's bill moves is easy - a
bill introduced by a member of the majority party almost always moves over one
introduced by a member of the minority. But in this case, Republicans had introduced
both bills.
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Senate bill first and had a constituent in his district who was following the
progress of the Senate bill. Hadden noted that we had moved the House
bill "only" out of a sense of good government. I pointed out all of the
work we had done to overcome opposition to the bill. In addition,
because the bill had changed so much from the Senate version, I argued
that we had the better claim. I also expressed a more substantive
concern. The Senate Judiciary Committee had not issued a report on
Senate bill 768, whereas the House Judiciary Committee had filed the
report I wrote on House bill 3380, which included a very detailed section-
by-section analysis of the bill. All of us expected that the enacted bill
would be challenged in court at some point and we knew that courts
often consider the committee report as the best legislative history of a
bill. I told Hadden that I was concerned that if we allowed the Senate
bill number to become law, even using the House bill text, judges might
ignore the House report when interpreting the statute, even though the
text of the House bill discussed in the report and the text of the statute
would be identical.M Hadden promised that if we agreed to let the
Senate bill be used, he would ask Sessions to put into the Congressional
Record a statement that the Senate was adopting the House report as its
own and intended that it be used to interpret the bill.
It was clear that neither side would budge, so we left it for the
members to resolve. I knew that it was unlikely that McCollum would
refuse a request from a member of the body he hoped to join, especially
a senator of our own party, but I felt obligated to make the pitch to him
to hold out for the House bill number. McCollum was in town for an
important vote on the floor and we met to discuss the situation.
McCollum listened politely but told me he did not think he could refuse
Sessions' request. McCollum did suggest that Sessions would now owe
us a favor, a valuable commodity in Washington politics.
Later that same day, Sessions called McCollum, who agreed to allow
the Senate bill to come to the House floor and be amended with the text
of the House bill as it had passed the committee. Then the amended
Senate bill would be sent back to the Senate for final passage. We told
Chambliss' staff of the deal and ensured them that the House would pass
the bill Chambliss had introduced first, in order to give him some credit
264. Although bills are often amended on the House or Senate floor after they are
reported from the committee of jurisdiction, we avoided making any amendments to
House bill 3380 after it was reported by the Judiciary Committee. We did this to ensure
that the analysis of the bill contained in the committee report, which discusses the bill in
the form it is reported from committee, and the language of the enacted bill would match
exactly.
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for the final product. We explained that immediately after the House
passed Chambliss' bill, we would then call up the Senate bill, strike out
its text, add our text, and pass the bill.
Because the bill was no longer controversial, it was scheduled for a day
when the "suspension of the rules" procedure is used to bring bills up for
debate and votes. McCollum had been routinely missing the votes on
suspension days in order to have more time to campaign in Florida, and
so we knew that he would not be in town when the bill came to the floor.
Therefore, we recruited Representative Chabot to stand in for
McCollum and I wrote two statements for Chabot to use. One statement
was to be read aloud on the floor and a longer, more detailed statement
was to be placed into the Congressional Record. I used this opportunity
to mention Pauley and the people from DoD who had helped us craft the
bill.
On July 25, the bill came to the House floor. Chabot read the short
statement and introduced the longer one into the record.266
261Representatives Scott and Chambliss also spoke in support of the bill.
The bill passed by voice vote because no member requested a recorded
vote. 6' A few minutes later, I realized that I had forgotten to arrange for
the Senate bill to also be passed. I told the committee parliamentarian,
Dan Freeman, of my mistake. Freeman wrote out by hand the
appropriate request for Representative Chabot to read. Representative
Chabot was still on the floor pinch-hitting for another of the committee's
265. Bills considered "under suspension of the rules" in the House come to the floor
without a rule passed by the House Rules Committee to govern debate. The trade off for
the streamlined procedure is that the bill must receive a two-thirds vote of the members
voting on the bill. For this reason, generally only non-controversial bills are brought up
for a vote under this procedure. Suspending the rules also means that no committee
report is required to be filed prior to consideration of the bill by the full House, although
the Judiciary Committee's practice is to file one anyway. See generally Rules of the House
of Representatives, 106th Congress, Rule XV (1999), in CQ PRESS, 2 GUIDE TO
CONGRESS 1036 (5h ed. 2000); CHARLES W. JOHNSON, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 886, at 621-22 (1999); LEWIS
DESCHLER, 6 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES Ch. 21 § 9.7 (1977).
266. 146 CONG. REC. H6929 (daily ed. July 25, 2000); see also id. at H6930-32(prepared statement of Representative Bill McCollum introduced into the record by
Representative Chabot during the House debate on H.R. 3380).
267. Id. at H6929-30.
268. Id. at H6932. The Clinton Administration reiterated its support of the bill, in the
form it had been amended in the Judiciary Committee. See Office of Management and
Budget, Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3380 (July 25, 2000), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/ 06-2/hr3380-h.html.
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subcommittee chairman on another bill. Chabot read the request
Freeman wrote and the House passed Senate bill 768 by voice vote, with
the text of House bill 3380 substituted for its text. House bill 3380 was
then "laid upon the table," meaning that only Senate bill 768 would be
sent to the Senate.269
11. Once More in the Senate
After the August recess ended and Congress returned to work,
Hadden had trouble getting Senate Democrats to allow the bill to move.
In the Senate, when the majority intends to bring a bill to the floor, the
staff in each party's cloakroom sends out a message to their members. In
response to this message, a senator can place a "hold" on a bill, which
effectively prevents it from coming to the floor. A senator can also
simply delay his or her response to the notice, effectively placing a "soft
hold" on a bill. While the hold practice was originally devised to allow
senators more time to review a bill, 27 the practice is often used to gain
political leverage. Senate bill 768 was quickly "cleared" the Republican
cloakroom, meaning that all Republican senators had responded and no
objections had been received. But, there was no clearance from the
Democratic cloakroom. Given that the bill was supported by DoD,
Justice, and the ACLU-a very unusual combination of supporters-and
that it had passed the Senate once before by unanimous consent, there
was no reason to think that the delay was due to any substantive
objections to the bill. Hadden and I surmised that one or more of the
Democratic senators was holding up the bill so that McCollum could not
take credit for it in his Senate race.
As a result, Hadden and I became very worried that Congress would
adjourn for the year without sending the bill to the President. If that
happened, the bill would die and we would have to start the whole
process over again in the next Congress. I felt that DoD needed to do
more to move the bill and called Baldwin to tell him so. Baldwin told me
that the legislative affairs staff in the OSD was now calling the shots with
regard to this bill and suggested that I speak to them directly. I placed a
269. 146 CONG. REC. H6940 (daily ed. July 25, 2000); see also Id. at H6930-32
(prepared statement of Representative McCollum). Because of my mental lapse, the
passage of House bill 3380 occurs on page H6932 of the Congressional Record, while the
motion to table that bill and pass Senate bill 768 in its place does not occur until eight
pages later, at page H6940.
270. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 477-78, 835
(Donald C. Bacon et al. eds., 1995); see also BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX
LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 41-43 (2000).
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call to one of the officers working in that office, but did not feel that I
had made much headway. The officer told me that the Secretary of
Defense, at their prompting, had written to Senators Trent Lott and Tom
Daschel, the Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate
respectively, and that Senator Daschel's staff had called OSD the next
day to ask questions about the bill. I suggested that other Democrats
were behind the stall and encouraged him to prompt a very senior
officer, perhaps one of the Judge Advocates General, to make a call to
key Senate Democrats to emphasize how important the bill was to the
military. A few days later, Army General John M. Keane, the second
most senior officer in the Army, called Senator Leahy to ask for his help
in moving the bill. Later, Leahy made a speech on the floor of the
Senate in support of the bill.
Hadden called me to say that the Democratic cloakroom staff had
informed their Republican counterparts that the bill had finally been
cleared for floor consideration. On October 26, 2000, the Senate
considered the bill as it had been passed by the House."' As Hadden
promised, Sessions acknowledged that the House report "reflects the
intentions of the Senate."2"' The Senate then agreed to the House
271amendment to the bill and passed the bill for a second and final time.
12. Getting the Bill to the President
Under the Constitution, the President has ten days to sign a bill into
law once it is presented to him, 74 but Congress delays often the formal
presentment of a bill to the President. In some cases, the delay is done
by congressional leadership for political reasons, such as when they are
attempting to tie the enactment of a bill, or its veto, to some other event.
In other cases, however, the delay is requested by the White House, most
often to accommodate the President's travel plans.
Congress did not finish its work before the election and left town, with
plans to return for a rare "lame duck" session in mid-November.
Baldwin called to express his concern that the bill had not been
presented to the President. I called Hadden to ask that he check with the
Senate Clerk's office, as they would be responsible for formally
presenting the bill to the President at the White House. President
271. 146 CONG. REC. Sl 181-84 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 2000).
272. Id. at SF1183. Senator Leahy, the ranking minority member of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, also acknowledged the House Report and stated, "I agree
with Senator Sessions with respect to the report." Id.
273. Id.atS1184.
274. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
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Clinton had been out of Washington for much of late October and early
November campaigning for the Vice President, the First Lady (in her bid
for the U.S. Senate seat for New York), and for numerous other
congressional candidates. Hadden called back quickly to say that the
Senate clerk's office had assured him that there was no problem and that
the White House had simply requested that no bills be presented while
the President was expected to be gone. I called Baldwin to relay the
news and to ask if the Army's Office of Congressional and Legislative
Liaison had made any headway in requesting a small signing ceremony
for the bill. Baldwin said that his office was working the request through
the Defense Secretary's office.
On the Monday before Thanksgiving, I called up the bill on the
Library of Congress website275 and found that it had been formally
presented to the President on November 13, thus giving him ten days to
sign the bill. I called Baldwin to let him know, but he had already heard
news of the presentment from another source. Bladwin also informed
me that the signing ceremony was not going to happen. We found out
later that White House staff had opposed any ceremony for a bill
sponsored by (or, in this case, merely identified with) Representative
McCollum, because he had been one of the House Managers who
prosecuted President Clinton in the impeachment trial in the Senate.
Two days later, on November 22, Baldwin called to tell me that President
Clinton had signed the bill into law that morning.
111. THE GAP IS CLOSED
A. An Analysis of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 enacted chapter
212 of Title 18 of the United States Code, entitled "Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction." This section of the article discusses in
depth each of the seven sections of that new chapter.
1. Section 3261: Criminal Offenses Committed by Certain Members of
the Armed Forces and by Persons Employed by or Accompanying the
Armed Forces Outside the United States
Section 3261 is the heart of the new chapter and states the new offense
created by the Act. The section creates a new federal crime involving
conduct engaged in outside the United States by members of the Armed
275. The site is known as "Thomas" and is available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
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Forces or by persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces
abroad that would be a felony if it had occurred in the United States.
Although the language of the Act uses the jurisdictional phrase "if
committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States," we made it clear in the Judiciary Committee's report on
House bill 3380 that "acts that would be a Federal crime regardless of
where they are committed in the United States, such as the drug crimes
in title 21, also fall within the scope of [section 3261(a)]. 276
In essence, section 3261 is a type of assimilative crime statute. At one
point in the development of the bill, Filkins and I debated with DoD
representatives as to whether the statute was enacting a new crime or
simply extending the reach of all existing federal crimes to persons
accompanying the military overseas. While we ultimately convinced
DoD that it was the former, much of our debate turned on analogies to
27the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act. DoD was familiar with that
statute because federal prosecutors often use it to prosecute civilians who
commit minor crimes on military reservations for which there is no
corresponding federal statute. In drafting the bill, we had discussed this
statute with federal prosecutors who told us that when they charged a
defendant under that statute they often referenced in the charging
document the state statute that had been "assimilated." However, it was
understood that the offense charged was a federal offense under the Title
18 section and not a violation of the state statute. The practice of noting
the "assimilated" state crime was done merely to put the defendant and
the court on notice as to what the government planned to prove at trial. "
This analogy convinced the DoD representatives that prosecutions under
section 3261 would be for violations of that section and not for violations
of any other Title 18 section referenced in the charging document.
As discussed above, prosecutions under the new law may be brought
276. House Report, supra note 257, at 14-15 & n.27.
277. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). Prosecutions under that act are not to enforce state law but
to enforce the federal criminal law whose details have been adopted from state law by
reference. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS DESKBOOK § 2-19c (1996) (citing Puerto Rico v. Shell Co.,
302 U.S. 253, 266 (1937)).
278. House Report, supra note 257, at 15 n.29. To help judges and defendants
understand the assimilation process, we stated in the report that:
[lI]t would be helpful in charging violations of section 3261 for prosecutors to
make a reference to the statute that would have been violated had the act
occurred within the United States, so as to put the defendant on notice of the
elements of the crime that the Government will attempt to prove and the
maximum punishment that may be imposed for the violation of section 3261.
Id.
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only against persons who fall within two broad groups of people, both
defined in the bill: (1) persons employed by or accompanying the Armed
Forces outside of the United States; or (2) persons who are members of
the Armed Forces and are subject to the UCMJ at the time the conduct
occurred. 279 The maximum punishment for the crime is determined by
cross referencing the maximum punishment provided for under the
federal statute that makes the same conduct an offense if it wascommtte wihin he nitd o 280
committed within the United States. If the person committing the
crime is a juvenile, however, the federal juvenile delinquency procedures
apply. 8
In some cases, conduct may violate both section 3261 and another
federal statute having extraterritorial application. We intended that
Justice have the flexibility to proceed with its strongest case against the
defendant, and so we noted in the report that "[i]n such cases, the
Government may proceed under either statute. ' '282  When military
members violate section 3261 their acts will also likely violate the UCMJ.
In such cases, however, the government does not have the discretion to
choose which statute to use. The Act prohibits prosecutions of military
members unless they are indicted with at least one civilian. In short, the
Act gives DoD the exclusive right to prosecute military members,
provided they are not part of a conspiracy or other illegal activity with
civilians. If a military member is indicted with a civilian, however, the
Act allows the government to prosecute the military member in federal
court.2" This remains the case even if the federal judge later orders that
284the military and civilian defendants be tried separately.
279. See supra note 166-168 and accompanying text.
280. The House Report on House bill 3380 provided an example of how the maximum
punishment under section 3261 would be determined:
[1]f a person described in subsection (a) were to engage in conduct outside the
United States that would violate section 2242 of Title 18 (relating to sexual
abuse) were it to have occurred on federal property within the United States,
that conduct will violate new section 3261 and may be punished by a United
States court in the same manner provided for in section 2242. The offense to be
charged, however, is a violation of section 3261, not section 2242. Section 2242
only determines the maximum punishment that may be imposed for the violation
of section 3261. Technically, a violation of section 2242 need not be charged.
House Report, supra note 257, at 15.
281. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1994).
282. House Report, supra note 257, at 15 n.28 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114 (1979)).
283. House Report, supra note 257, at 16. As we stated in the House Report, the
provision "is designed to allow the Government to try the military member together with a
non-military co-defendant in a United States Court." Id.
284. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 3261,
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Subsection (b) of section 3261 limits prosecutions if a foreign
government, in accordance with jurisdiction recognized by the United
States, has prosecuted or is prosecuting a person for the conduct that
constitutes the offense.2s' However, this section contains an exception
allowing a prosecution in the United States even after a foreign
government has prosecuted a person for the acts that violate section
3261, if such prosecution is approved by the Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, or a person acting in either of those capacities.286
Simply put, this provision allows the United States a "second bite at the
apple" in order to prosecute a defendant a second time, presumably
when it believes that the punishment by the host nation is insufficient.
Subsection 3261(c) provides that the act does not deprive a court-
martial, or other military court, commission, or tribunal, of the
jurisdiction it may otherwise have over an offender."" This provision was
included in the Act to preserve the use, however rare, of forums other
than Article III courts to prosecute defendants - military or civilian -
who violate American law. This subsection complements subsection (d),
which limits prosecutions under section 3261 against persons who were
288
members of the Armed Forces at the time they committed the crime.
The limitation under subsection (d) does not apply, however, if the
person is no longer subject to the UCMJ.2"9 For example, discharged
soldiers who are not eligible to receive retirement pay are no longer
subject to the UCMJ.290 Because of this, the government is powerless to
114 Stat. 2488. Because section 3261(d)(2) only requires that the military member be
indicted, or an information filed against him, together with another person, this element of
the crime will be satisfied even if the judge approves a motion for separate trials. Id. Of
course, in such a situation, Justice could agree to dismiss the complaint against the military
member so that DoD could proceed against him or her by court-martial, but nothing in the
statute requires this.
285. House Report, supra note 257, at 16. In the House Report we noted that, in most
instances, this recognition will occur through a SOFA entered into by the United States
and the host nation. Id. But the existence of a SOFA is not required by the Act.
286. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3261(b) (2001).
287. Id. § 3261(c).
288. Id. § 3261(d).
289. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4) (1994).
290. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(c) (1994). Under current law, only persons entitled to receive
retirement pay (generally paid only to those who served for twenty years or more on
active duty) and retired members of a reserve component who are receiving
hospitalization from an Armed Force, may be recalled to active duty for the purpose of
being tried for an offense under the UCMJ after they are discharged. See 10 U.S.C. §
802(a)(4)-(5) (1994). Generally, except for these two classes of persons, a properly
discharged service member is no longer subject to court-martial jurisdiction. See MCM,
supra note 8, at 11-13 (discussing R.C.M. 202(a)(1)(A)(iii)).
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prosecute them under the UCMJ, or under federal law for acts they
commit outside the United States.29' Like the problem of crimes
committed by civilians accompanying the Armed Forces, the inability to
prosecute discharged soldiers has plagued the military for some time.92
The Act enables the government to prosecute soldiers who commit
crimes while a member of the military, but are discharged before their
guilt is discovered. The exception in subsection (d) helps to make this
clear. The Act also allows the government to prosecute a person who
commits a crime while in federal service as a member of a reserve
component but then returns to civilian life, where he or she is no longer
subject to the UCMJ. 293 Finally, as discussed above, the limitation on the
prosecution of military members in subsection (d) does not apply if the
military member is charged for the offense together with at least one
other person, who is not subject to the UCMJ. In such a case, concurrent
jurisdiction would exist to try the person under either the UCMJ or
under chapter 212.
2. Section 3262: Arrest and Commitment
Section 3262 authorizes employees of the DoD to arrest and detain
persons suspected of violating section 3261. While military officials, such
as military police and criminal investigators, arrest and detain civilians
who commit crimes and infractions, such as traffic violations, on military
property, their arrest power is limited to only a "reasonable period of
time sufficient to investigate the crime and transfer" the accused to
294appropriate civil authorities. Civilian authorities, however, seldom will
291. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
293. Members of the military who serve in one of the reserve components are subject
to the UCMJ only when serving in a federal duty status. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1), (3)
(1994). In order to use the UCMJ to prosecute members of the Reserve or National
Guard who commit illegal acts abroad while in uniform, the member must be called to
active duty. Id. § 802(d). The intent of the Act's drafters was to allow the government to
prosecute the person in a civilian court instead. As we made clear in the House Report:
"In essence, the bill gives the Government concurrent jurisdiction with the military over
members of the reserve components who commit crimes overseas." House Report, supra
note 257, at 12 n.23.
294. See Major Matthew J. Gilligan, Opening the Gate?: An Analysis of Military Law
Enforcement Authority Over Civilian Lawbreakers On and Off the Federal Installation, 161
M1L. L. REV. 1, 18 (1999); see also U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. 190-30, Military Police
Investigations §§ 4-8 (June 1, 1978); U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. 195-2, Criminal
Investigative Activities § 3.21 (Oct. 30, 1985). The regulations do not use the term
"arrest," but speak in terms of "detain" and "apprehend," respectively, so as to emphasize
the temporary nature of the military custody. Id. We used the term "arrest" in section
3262 expressly to make the point that DoD's authority under the Act was qualitatively
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be present in a foreign country, therefore, section 3262 gives military
authorities broad power to arrest and hold civilians who commit crimes
while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces abroad.2 5 Under
Section 3262, the Secretary of Defense is to designate persons who may
arrest civilians. The section also states that the usual standard for
making arrests, requiring that probable cause exists to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed
such offense, applies to arrests made under section 3262. If the person is
held in custody and, is later ordered detained after an initial appearance
before a United States Magistrate, section 3262 requires military officials
to deliver the person arrested to the custody of civilian law enforcement
authorities of the United States as soon as practicable, unless the person
is to be tried under the UCMJ.
296
3. Section 3263: Delivery to Authorities of Foreign Countries
Section 3263 requires that in the event that a host nation chooses to
use its own laws to prosecute a person for acts that violate section 3261,
American military officials must deliver the accused to the custody of
"appropriate authorities of a foreign country." 97 However, delivery to
foreign authorities is not automatic. Foreign officials must first request
that the accused be delivered to them, and the accused may only be
handed over if delivery is authorized by a treaty or other international
agreement to which the United States is a party. In most cases, this
agreement will be a SOFA. The decision as to which officials of a foreign
country constitute "appropriate authorities" for the purposes of taking
custody of a defendant is left to the Secretary of Defense, who must
consult with the Secretary of State.
4. Sections 3264 and 3265
As discussed above, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of
2000 contains an unusual and complex pair of sections 9  One section
different from the authority it has in the United States.
295. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994), is generally understood not to
apply outside the United States, just as most other Title 18 crimes do not. See 13 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 321 (1989); see also United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973).
But see United States v. Kahn, 35 F.3d 426, 431 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the issue is
not definitely resolved). In any event, however, the specific language of the Act
empowering military law enforcement officials to make arrests should be seen as
controlling over the nineteenth century statute's general prohibition.
296. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3262 (2001).
297. Id. § 3263.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 247-255.
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limits the power of the government to return a defendant to the United
States until certain conditions have been met'99 and the other section
requires some of the initial proceedings in a case to be held before the
defendant is returned to the United States.3°° These provisions were
added to the bill during the House deliberations on House bill 3380 to
address the concerns of the ACLU and FEA.0' In response to these
concerns, Representative McCollum offered an amendment to the bill at
the full committee markup that added sections 3264 and 3265. For the
ease of understanding, each section is addressed below in reverse
numerical order.
a. Section 3265: Initial Proceedings
Section 3265 governs the initial appearance before a judge of a person
who is arrested for or charged with a violation of section 3261 and is not
delivered to foreign authorities for prosecution.3 2 The section allows a
federal magistrate judge to conduct the initial appearance of the
defendant before the court by telephone "or such other means that
enables voice communication among the participants. .."'0 While a
telephone conference is not required under Act because the judge retains
the discretion to order the defendant to be returned to the United States
to attend the appearance in person,3 O most initial appearances under the
Act should be conducted by this means. Given the perfunctory nature of
the initial appearance, there would be little benefit in requiring the
defendant to physically appear in court. Section 3265 was enacted in
order to appease the ACLU and FEA and was based on the expectation
299. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3264 (2001).
300. Id. § 3265.
301. In light of these changes to the bill, both the ACLU and FEA supported the
passage of House bill 3380. Letter from Mary Elizabeth Teasley, Director of Government
Relations, National Education Association, and Rachel King, Legislative Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union, to Representative Bill McCollum, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Crime, U.S. House of Representatives, and Representative Bobby
Scott, ranking minority member, Subcommittee on Crime, U.S. House of Representatives
(July 12, 2000) (on file with the Subcommittee on Crime).
At the hearing on the bill, an FEA representative expressed concern that House bill
3380, as it was introduced, would have allowed the government to forcibly return a person
to the United States soon after allegations against them were lodged with authorities, but
before any real investigation into the merits of the allegations had occurred. Hearings,
supra note 133, at 27-31 (statement of Mohr). FEA's main concern was that innocent
defendants might have to bear the expensive costs of returning to a far away duty station
once charges against them had been dismissed. Id. (statement of Mohr).
302. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3265 (2001).
303. Id. § 3265(a)(1)(B).
304. House Report, supra note 257, at 19-20.
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that it would be routinely used. As a result, we attempted to emphasize
this fact in the House report by stating the committee's view that "in the
vast majority of cases, the initial appearance of a person arrested or
charged under section 3261 will be conducted by telephone or other
appropriate means so that the defendant may remain in the country
where he or she was arrested or was found., 30 5 In order to encourage the
use of video conferencing where available, the report also notes that the
preferred manner of conducting the hearing is by video teleconference or
similar means.36
Section 3265 also governs any detention hearing held under section
3142(f) of Title 18.307 The section authorizes the judge to conduct a
detention hearing by telephone or such other means that allows all
parties to participate and to be heard by all other participants. 08 Unlike
the initial appearance, however, the detention hearing may be conducted
by telephonic communication only when the defendant requests it.
309
The Act treats the detention hearing differently from the initial
appearance because a defendant has the right to testify, to present
witnesses and other information and to confront witnesses testifying
against him at the detention hearing. These rights have constitutional
dimensions. Therefore, if the defendant does not request that the
detention hearing be conducted by electronic means, it must be held with
the defendant physically present in the United States.3 ' If the defendant
is being held by military authorities at that time of the detention hearing,
the government must transport the defendant to the United States for
the hearing. If the defendant instead chooses to remain in the foreign
country, he will be deemed to have waived any right he or she may have
to be physically present before the judge. Further, even if the defendant
does request the hearing to be conducted by telephone or video
conference, the judge retains the discretion to determine whether to
3 12grant such request.
305. Id. at 20.
306. Id.
307. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3265(b) (2001).
308. Id.
309. Id. § 3265(b)(2).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
311. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3265(b)(2) (2001).
312. As I promised Pauley, I included in the House Report factors that the judge
might consider in making the decision regarding an electronic hearing. The factors listed
in the report are: whether the government opposes the defendant's request (to include
considerations based on military exigencies or special circumstances bearing on the issue),
the likelihood from information presented at the initial appearance that the defendant will
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Section 3265(c) enacts a provision that is likely to cause some concern
in military circles. Subsection (c) provides for the appointment of
military counsel to represent defendants accused of violating section 3261
during the initial proceedings described in the Act. 33 This subsection
provides that if the defendant is financially unable to retain counsel, or if
no qualified civilian counsel is available, the judge may appoint qualified
military counsel to represent the defendant. 34 The judge may appoint
only those members of the military designated for that purpose by the315
Secretary of Defense. Neither the Act nor the House report prescribe
which officers must be designated (except that they must be judge
advocates) or how the fact of their designation is to be made known to
the non-military magistrate judge. Clearly, this issue will have to be
addressed in the implementing regulations for the Act and perhaps also
in each service's regulations that govern the administration of military
law in general. The Act limits the representation by appointed military
counsel to the initial proceedings described in section 3265, and then only
if the defendant is not removed to the United States for those
proceedings.316  In other words, once the government returns the
defendant to the United States, or he or she returns voluntarily, the
defendant may no longer be represented by a military attorney.
b. Section 3264: Limitation on Removal
The forced removal of a defendant to the United States is governed by
section 3264 of the Act. This section was a major provision added to the
bill by Representative McCollum in response to the concerns of the
ACLU and FEA. Section 3264 limits the power of military and civil law
enforcement officials to remove a person arrested for or charged with a
violation of section 3261 from the country in which they are arrested orf 317
found. As noted in the House Report, the phrase "arrested for or
charged with" was used "to make it clear that the limitation applies to
situations where the person has been arrested and also where the person
has not been arrested but has been charged by indictment or the filing of
be ordered detained, whether the parties intend to present live witness testimony at the
hearing, and the residence of any witnesses. House Report, supra note 257, at 20. The
language in the report makes it clear that this list is not designed to be an exhaustive list of
the factors that a judge must consider.
313. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3265(c) (2001).
314. Id. § 3265(c)(1).
315. Id. § 3265(c)(2).
316. Id. § 3265(c)(1).
317. See id. § 3264.
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an information" and arrested later:
Section 3264(a) states the general prohibition forbidding the forcible
return to the United States of a person arrested or charged with a
violation of section 3261."'9 Further, the person may not be taken to any
foreign country other than a country in which the person is believed to
have committed the crime or crimes for which they have been arrested or
charged.20 This means that once American authorities arrest a person
for a violation of section 3261, whether because of a citizen's complaint
or after an information or indictment is returned against the person, the
defendant must be held in the country in which he or she was arrested or
in the country in which the crime is believed to have been committed. If
a person commits a crime in one country and then flees that country,
military authorities have the option of returning him or her to the
country in which the crime was committed.321
There are five exceptions under which the prohibition on forced
removal does not apply. Two exceptions relate to the issue of detention.
First, federal magistrate judges may order a defendant to be removed to
the United States to appear at a detention hearing.3 22 If that occurs, the
Act requires the defendant to be removed to the United States in time to
attend the hearing.323 Second, if a judge orders a defendant detained
pending trial, the Act requires that the defendant be detained in the
United States and that he be "promptly removed" to the United States
324for that purpose. Additionally, the prohibition does not apply if the
defendant is entitled to and does not waive a preliminary examination
325
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. While a defendant is
not entitled to that hearing if an indictment is returned or an information
is filed against him, the Act requires that if that hearing does take place,
it must occur within the time limits set forth in the rules and the
defendant must be removed to the United States in time to attend it.
326
The fourth exception to the prohibition on forced removal of a
defendant to the United States gives federal magistrate judges the
authority to order the defendant to be removed to the United States at
318. See House Report, supra note 257, at 18.
319. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3264(a) (2001).
320. Id.
321. See id.
322. Id. § 3264(b)(1).
323. Id.
324. Id. § 3264(b)(2).
325. Id. § 3264(b)(3); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, 5.1.
326. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3264(b)(3) (2001).
[Vol. 51:55
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
any time.12' This provision, however, was intended to be a catchall for
unforeseen circumstances and not a way for judges to simply ignore the
prohibition on removal. To emphasize this point, the exception is
described in the House Report as: "removal of a person for a reason
other than [those] discussed above would be rare, paragraph (b)(4)
grants judges the discretion to order such removal. 3 28
The final exception allows DoD officials to remove a defendant from
the place where he or she is arrested if the Secretary of Defense
determines that military necessity requires it.329  The House Report
explains that this authority is to be used "only in situations where the
person is arrested in an 'immature theater' or in such other place where it
is not reasonable to expect that the initial proceedings required by
section 3265 can be carried out."33 Section 3264 allows the military to
transfer a defendant to a place other than where the crime was
committed or where the person was arrested. 31 However, even in that
situation, the authority is limited to removing the defendant only to the
"nearest United States military installation outside the United States that
is adequate to detain the person and facilitate the initial proceedings
described in section 3265. "332 The term "nearest" should be interpreted
to mean the closest military installation to the place from which the
defendant is removed.
5. Section 3266: Regulations
Section 3266 of the Act requires the Secretary of Defense to prescribe
regulations governing the apprehension, detention, delivery, and removal
of persons under chapter 212 .3" The regulations should also provide for
the facilitation of the initial proceedings described in section 3265.334 The
regulations must require that, to the fullest extent practicable, notice be
given to the civilians to whom the statute applies (i.e., dependents,
327. Id. § 3264(b)(4).
328. House Report, supra note 257, at 18; see also supra text accompanying notes 254-
255.
329. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3264(b)(5) (2001).
330. House Report, supra note 257, at 18.
331. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3264 (2001).
332. House Report, supra note 257, at 18. The House Report also states that "[w]hile
new section 3264(b)(5) states that the installation must be adequate to 'facilitate the initial
appearance described in section 3265(a),' as a practical matter, it should also be adequate
to facilitate the proceedings described in 3265(b)." Id. at 19 n.36.
333. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3266 (2001).
334. Id.
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civilian DoD employees, and contractor personnel).335 These individuals
should be made aware that they are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of
the United States under chapter 212. The Act also provides, however,
that the failure to provide this notice does not defeat the jurisdiction of
the United States over the person or provide a defense to any proceeding
arising under the chapter.336
The Act requires the Secretary of Defense to consult with the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General in developing the
regulations required by section 3266."' 7 In addition, because Congress
intended to use its oversight power to monitor the way in which the
military implements the Act, we took the unusual step of requiring the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report, containing the proposed
regulations and such other information as the Secretary may determine is
appropriate, to the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary. In
fact, the Act prohibits the regulations from taking effect until ninety days
have passed from the date the report is submitted to those committees.339
Any amendments to these regulations must also be submitted to the
committees before they can take effect.34
6. Section 3267: Definitions
Section 3267 defines several key words and phrases used throughout
chapter 212. Most important among the definitions are the phrases
"employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States" and
"accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States." The Act
defines "employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States" to
mean a DoD civilian employee (including a nonappropriated fund
instrumentality (NAF) employee), a DoD contractor or subcontractor of
any level, or an employee of such contractor or subcontractor.141 Section
3267 specifically excludes persons who are nationals of the country in
which the crime is believed to have been committed or persons ordinarily
residing in that country.342 The phrase "accompanying the Armed Forces
outside the United States" is defined as including persons who are
335. Id. § 3266(b)(1).
336. Id. § 3266(b)(2).
337. Id. § 3266(a).
338. Id. § 3266(c).
339. Id. As of the end of December 2001, however, DoD had yet to submit the
regulations to the committees for this review.
340. Id.
341. Id. § 3267(1).
342. Id. § 3267(1)(c).
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dependents of and reside with military members, DoD civilian
employees or NAF employees, or DoD contractors and subcontractors
and their employees outside the United States.343 As with the prior
definition, this term also excludes persons who are nationals of the
country in which the crime is believed to have been committed or
persons ordinarily residing in that country.344 Finally, the House report
makes it clear that juveniles are included within these terms.345
B. Issues Not Addressed in the Act
As thorough as the Act is, there are several issues that it does not
address. These issues, however, must be examined in order to implement
the Act. This section of the Article addresses several of the issues not
addressed in the Act. Some of these were known to the drafters of the
Act but were intentionally left unaddressed; other issues have been
raised by lawyers who have reviewed the Act after its enactment. While
many of these issues may be resolved through regulation or memoranda
of agreement between the DoD and Justice, some of them may require
further congressional action.
1. The Military's Role After a Defendant is Arrested
One of the gray areas in the Act involves what role the military will
play in a case once a person is arrested for violating the Act. Will
military authorities contact a United States Attorney directly and present
the evidence that they have collected so far, or will officials at Justice
take on that responsibility? Will military officials continue to investigate
the case and collect evidence against the defendant after the initial
arrest? While the Act specifically authorizes military officials to arrest
and detain a civilian who may have violated section 3261, it is silent as to
whether military officials are to continue to investigate the case.
We wrote the Act to indicate a clear preference that civilian
authorities take charge of the defendant at the earliest possible time.
While we did not address whether civilian or military authorities would
lead the investigation into the crime, it was always our intention that
civilian authorities become involved as soon as possible. As a practical
matter, federal law enforcement officials will likely seek the involvement
of military investigative authorities through the end of the investigation.
Given that the military authorities will likely have valuable contacts with
343. Id. § 3267(2).
344. Id. § 3267(2)(c).
345. House Report, supra note 257, at 21-22.
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host nation authorities, their continued involvement should prove helpful
to the federal investigators who will be sent from the United States. As
long as all of the parties are clear that the civil law enforcement officials
control the investigation, this should not pose any problems.
Similarly, the Act does not address what role the military will have in
deciding when and where a case will be presented to a United States
Attorney for prosecution. Consistent with our preference for civilian law
enforcement involvement as soon as possible, the best approach would
be for a procedure to be agreed upon where military authorities
communicate the fact of an arrest under the Act to Justice, perhaps to its
Office of International Affairs or to a new office created specifically to
coordinate prosecutions under the Act. Justice officials would then
dispatch investigators to the area where the crime occurred and they
would decide if and where to proceed against the defendant.
2. Host Nation Involvement
The Act acknowledges a host nation's right to prosecute persons who
commit crimes in its country, provided it does so in accordance with
346jurisdiction recognized by the United States. In most cases, a SOFA
will determine which nation has the primary right to prosecute military
members. The statute is intended to recognize any such agreement. Of
course, absent the Act the host nation would have exclusive jurisdiction
over civilians in any event. The Act does not specify when the host
country must decide whether it will prosecute and the NATO SOFA
only requires that the host nation make this decision "as soon as
practicable. 3 47 Therefore, how long must U.S. authorities wait until they
begin a prosecution in the United States? There is no clear answer to
this question, and it may have to be addressed in future SOFAs.
A related question is the effect of the Act's provision for host nation
prosecutions if the defendant is removed to the United States or
voluntarily leaves the host nation and returns to the United States for
prosecution. If the host nation eventually commences a prosecution, is
prosecution by the United States barred? This turn of events is not
addressed in the Act. The statute was drafted with the assumption that
the host nation would make a prompt decision as to whether to prosecute
the defendant - before he or she returned to the United States. One
reading of the statute might suggest that if the host nation commences
prosecution at any time, even after the defendant returns to the United
346. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3261(b) (2001).
347. WOODLIFFE, supra note 13, at 181.
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States, then United States' jurisdiction is defeated. However, we did not
intend the Act to be an extradition statute requiring the United States to
return a defendant to a host nation. The statute was designed to simply
ensure that a prosecution in some country would occur. The better
interpretation of this section is that unless an existing extradition statue
requires the United States to return a defendant present in the United
States, then the United States' jurisdiction is not defeated and may
proceed.
Another important question concerns the power of U.S. authorities to
apprehend and detain civilians in a host nation. The intent of the
statute's drafters was that U.S. authorities could detain persons suspected
of violating the statute for as long as necessary to deliver them to
American civil authorities. But the authority of U.S. military authorities
to arrest civilians in a foreign country usually comes from an agreement
by the host nation in a SOFA. If a host nation has declined to prosecute
a person who violates the Act, may the United States military arrest the
person anyway? SOFA provisions that allow American military
authorities to assert police powers over civilians are based on the
assumption that the defendant may then be tried by the host nation. If
they will not be tried by the host nation, does the authority to arrest still
exist? If American authorities detain a civilian before the host nation is
asked to decide whether to prosecute the person, how long may the
defendant be held? Ordinarily, that power is limited to detaining a
person for so long as local authorities take to decide whether to take
custody of the person. In the event that local authorities choose not to
try the person, may U.S. military authorities nevertheless continue to
detain the person until American authorities decide whether to prosecute
the person in the United States? The answer under present SOFAs may
well be no, and many of these agreements may have to be renegotiated in
order to reflect the arrest authority given the military in the Act.
3. Assignment of a Case to a United States Attorney
Another related gray area is how to determine which United States
Attorney's office will handle the prosecution of a case under the Act.
Usually, law enforcement authorities in the judicial district where the
crime occurred will refer the case to the United States Attorney's office
in that jurisdiction for prosecution. In prosecutions under the Act, which
United States Attorney should be presented with the evidence collected
and requested to bring the case? If one United States Attorney declines
to seek an indictment, may Justice officials approach different United
States Attorneys until they find one who is willing to indict? The drafters
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of the Act intentionally left this issue open, believing that it was best left
to Justice to decide how to implement this aspect of the statute. As
discussed more fully below, however, the government could solve the
problem by deciding in advance of any prosecution where the initial
proceedings in cases under the Act will take place.
4. Venue for the Initial Proceedings
One of the most significant issues left unaddressed by the Act is how
federal magistrate judges will be appointed to preside over the initial
proceedings that are required for prosecutions under the Act. The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that venue for the
prosecution of an offense is to be in the district in which the offense was
348
committed. When the crime is not committed in any judicial district, as
will be the case for all prosecutions under the Act, a Title 18 statute
determines the place for trial.1' For that reason, we did not include a
specific venue provision in the bill when we were drafting it. When the
bill was amended during the markup process, however, the general
prohibition on removing the defendant to the United States was added.
As a result, in many cases the initial proceedings under the Act will now
occur before the defendant is returned to the United States (and before
the venue statute will govern). We chose not to address this issue by
amending the bill further because of time limitations. But, in hindsight,
we probably should have addressed this important issue.
For example, it may be that judges will not construe the federal venue
statute to apply to the initial proceedings under the Act because that
statute, by its terms, only determines the place of trial. Unlike Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 18, the rule that specifies venue for crimes
committed in the United States, the statute does not speak in terms of
the prosecution of the offense but merely the trial of the offense.
Even if a court did look to the statute for guidance, the application of
the statute could lead to conflicting decisions as to the proper jurisdiction
to conduct the proceedings. For example, under the Act, the initial
proceedings will often occur after the person is arrested, but before the
person is brought to the United States and, in many cases, even before
348. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.
349. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1994). Section 3238 provides that venue for trial lies in the
place where the defendant is "arrested or first brought." 1d. If the person is not arrest or
brought, then an indictment or information is to be filed in the district of the offender's
last known residence. Id. If the offender's last residence is unknown, then venue lies in
the in the District of Columbia. Id. Section 3238 has a long history because it was enacted
by the first Congress. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,8 n.9 (1957) (citing 1 Stat. 113-14).
[Vol. 51:55
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
any indictment is filed. Applying the venue statute to such a case would
cause venue to lie only in the District of Columbia. However, the
government may eventually bring the defendant to the United States for
trial and to a place other than the District of Columbia (as there is no
airport in that judicial district). Under the venue statute, venue for trial
would lie in the district to which the defendant was actually brought, i.e.,
where the airplane first lands in the United States. Therefore, applying
the federal venue statute to the Act might result in different jurisdictions
claiming the right to conduct different portions of the case. This is
clearly an unsatisfactory result.
In order to avoid this confusion, the government could simply use its
best guess as to where the defendant might be brought and seek out a
magistrate in that district to preside over the initial proceedings. Even
so, the magistrate judge might still note that no rule or statute specifically
authorizes him to preside over those proceedings and so may be reluctant
to act. Of course, should the government's guess as to where the
defendant will arrive in the United States be incorrect, the result might
again be that a judge in one district would conduct the initial proceedings
and a judge in another district would be authorized to preside over the
defendant's trial.
While this gray area is certainly not a fatal defect to prosecutions
under the Act, the issue could be addressed by a revision to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 18, or by promulgating a new rule that would
apply to prosecutions brought under the Act. Congress, however,
generally allows the Judicial Conference of the United States and its
various rules committees to propose changes in the several sets of rules
of procedure. Congress could, instead, amend the statutory venue
provision to address the unique procedures under the Act. For example,
since prosecutions under this Act are not likely to be common, a single
district could be established for all such prosecutions. Another approach
could be that one of several districts would be identified for this purpose
and assigned based on where the alleged crime occurred (e.g. the
Southern District of New York for crimes in Europe, the Southern
District of Florida for crimes in Central and South America, and the
District of Hawaii for crimes occurring in the Pacific rim countries).5
350. In the House Report on House bill 3380, we noted that the [C]ommittee
expects that the Department of Justice will develop a procedure for initiating
proceedings under chapter 212, which will include some means for selecting the
Federal judicial district in which such proceedings will be commenced. The bill
does not require, nor does it prohibit, that the initial proceedings of all cases
brought under chapter 212 be held in the same judicial district.
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5. Training of Military Defense Counsel and Their Liability for
Malpractice
As has been discussed, the Act takes a dramatic step in allowing
federal judges to appoint military judge advocates to represent civilian
defendants during the initial proceedings of a case under the Act. 5  This
authority raises several issues, including what additional training should
be given to military lawyers and what might be the extent of their liability
for the failure to properly represent their clients. While there are
similarities between military and non-military criminal practice, judge
advocates generally only receive training concerning the provisions of the
UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. Yet, military lawyers who are
selected to represent civilians under the Act will have to be familiar with
those provisions of Title 18 (including chapter 21.2) and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure that they will encounter during that
representation. To ensure that these defense lawyers are properly
trained for the task, the Secretary of Defense should mandate that all
judge advocates he designates as eligible for appointment to represent
civilians under the Act receive appropriate training from their respective
services for these additional responsibilities.
Military lawyers representing civilians under the Act will be subject to
liability for malpractice. Until the year 2000, the malpractice of federal
public defenders acting within the scope of their appointment subjected
the government to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).353
This act has now been modified slightly.354 Judge advocates who commit
The committee notes that venue for the trial of a violation of section 3261 is
governed by section 3238 of title 18. Nothing in the bill changes that. The
committee also notes that, in some cases, initial proceedings under section 3265
may be conducted by a judge who does not sit in the judicial district in which a
trial of the person arrested or charged may take place. That fact has no bearing
on the determination of venue under section 3238.
House Report, supra note 257, at 20.
351. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3265(c) (2001); see also supra text accompanying notes 313-316.
352. Federal Public defenders have been subject to malpractice liability for some time.
Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) ("[T]he essential office of appointed defense
counsel is akin to that of private counsel and is unlike that of a prosecutor, judge, or naval
captain, [so] we . . . conclude that the federal officer immunity doctrine . . . is simply
inapplicable in this case.").
353. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994).
354. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518 (2000).
Section 401 of that act exempted federal public defenders from the Federal Tort Claims
Act, but only with respect to their representations duties (i.e., other torts they may commit
would still fall within the scope of the FTCA). Id. § 401. Federal public defenders now
will rely solely on the malpractice provisions of the Criminal Justice Act, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(3). See H.R. REP. No. 106-312, at 26 (1999).
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malpractice while representing civilians may not render the government
liable because the FTCA does not apply to claims arising in a foreign
country."' As a result, any malpractice claims by clients represented by
military lawyers in foreign countries would be barred under the FTCA
and the government's sovereign immunity may preclude any other
recovery against the government. The lack of a statute allowing those
clients to recover from the government may lead some courts to find that
judge advocates were not acting within the scope of their employment in
representing defendants. If so, military lawyers representing clients in
foreign countries may find themselves personally liable. However, Judge
advocates will never actually defend civilian defendants at trial, and one
would hope that nothing could go so wrong during the course of their
short-term representation that would actually raise this issue.
6. Applicability to Foreign Nationals
One area in which there was very little discussion during the drafting,
the public hearings, or the floor debate on the Act is the breadth of its
applicability to foreign nationals. The Act applies to the criminal acts of
all foreign nationals who are employed by or accompanying the United
States Armed Forces abroad."' The only exception to this application is
when the persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces are
nationals of the country in which the crime occurs or they ordinarily live
there.357 This exception was included in the bill, in part out of a belief
that host nations would likely take an interest in punishing the criminal
acts of their own citizens, even if they were committed only against
Americans or American-owned property. In addition, this exception was
included to address concerns that host nations might resist the presence
of American troops in their countries if allowing such presence might
subject its own citizens to trial in the United States.
Yet, while the statute only extends jurisdiction to third-nation foreign
nationals, it represents a significant expansion of the reach of American
criminal law over non-citizens who commit acts outside of the United
States. While some federal criminal statutes do apply to acts committed
by foreign persons outside of the United States, those statutes also
require injury to an American national or property or that some
355. The FTCA does not apply to claims arising in a foreign country. 28 U.S.C. §
2680(k) (1994). As military lawyers will only represent clients in foreign countries under
the Act, any malpractice claims would be barred under the FTCA. As a result, it may be
that the government's sovereign immunity precludes any recovery by a person harmed.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 276 and 345.
357. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3267(1)(c), (2)(c).
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consequence of their acts occur in the United States. 58 The Military
Exterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 does not require such injury be
shown; in fact, the Act does not require that any American person or
property be involved at all. For example, if a third-country national
accompanying the United States Armed Forces, such as a contract
employee, commits a crime against another third-country national, the
Act gives United States courts subject matter jurisdiction over the crime
even though no American was involved in any way.
This portion of the Act will likely be subjected to a court challenge.
There is, of course, ample reason for the U.S. government to prosecute
these perpetrators. Many third-country nationals may only be present in
a host nation because of their relationship with the United States
military. Should the host nation decline to prosecute an offending third-
country national, all of the potential harms of the jurisdictional gap
discussed above would threaten our military again. Further, even though
no American may be involved, the potential harm to the confidence of
the United States military members and their dependents in the U.S.
government is a sufficient interest to justify the U.S. government's desire
to assert its jurisdiction over third-country nationals.
7. The Breadth of the Act
The Act was written to have a broad scope. The language we used to
describe the crime-"conduct outside the United States that would
constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than [one]
year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States" - is very broad indeed. In
drafting the statute, all of us had traditional common law crimes in
mind-murder, rape and other sexual offenses, drug trafficking, larceny,
etc. These crimes are found in Titles 18 and 21 of the United States
Code. There are, however, other federal statutes that provide for
criminal liability, which are not codified in these titles.3 9 Even though
many of these statutes refer to acts within the United States, the
language used in the Military Exterritorial Jurisdiction Act 2000 would
seem to include these crimes within the scope of the Act. None of
drafters specifically considered whether these crimes should have been
358. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332-2332a (1994).
359. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1327 (1994) (assisting inadmissible aliens to enter the United
States); 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1994) (depositing refuse in navigable waters); id. § 1319(c)
(1994) (water pollution); 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994) (selling human organs for transplants);
id. § 408 (1994) (misusing social security card); id. § 6928(d) (1994) (hazardous waste
mismanagement); 50 U.S.C. § 217 (1994) (trading in captured or abandoned property).
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included.
Because the government always retains the discretion to decide
whether to bring a case, this gray area may not cause problems. If many
cases are brought under the Act to punish conduct that would not fall
under Titles 18 or 21, however, Congress may decide to narrow the scope
of section 3261 so that it applies only to acts punishable under those
titles.
8. Applicability to Other Americans Abroad
A few months after the Act had been in effect, representatives of the
State Department met with staff members of the House Committee on
International Relations and me to discuss several legislatives changes
that they wanted Congress to consider. One of them was a proposal to
amend the Act to expand its applicability to include employees of the
State Department and their family members accompanying them abroad.
The State Department representatives noted that they have thousands of
employees and accompanying family members stationed at diplomatic
missions throughout the world. Any crimes these persons might commit
would go unpunished because of the same jurisdictional gap in the law
that the DoD had brought to our attention and which led us to draft the
Act. While they did not offer examples of specific crimes that actually
had been committed in the past by State Department employees or
family members, the State Department representatives did mention that
such cases had been discussed within the department and had prompted
their request to our two committees.
When we drafted the Act, neither DoD nor Justice mentioned any
concern that crimes committed by State Department personnel or their
families were falling through the gap. In addition, the executive branch
reports issued over the years which we reviewed at the time we drafted
the Act addressed only the effect of the jurisdictional gap on crimes
committed by DoD personnel and their family members.3 6 As a result,
we simply never considered applying the Act to anyone other than DoD
employees, contractors, and their respective family members. In
hindsight, we should have thought more about this. The jurisdictional
gap clearly allowed crimes committed by any Americans abroad to go
unpunished. All of the justifications for enacting the new law with
respect to DoD personnel and their family members36' also apply with
respect to State Department personnel and their dependents. Further,
360. See supra notes 137-146 and accompanying text.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 160-162.
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because the option of host nation prosecution is entirely prevented as to
State Department personnel who are given diplomatic immunity (unless
our government chooses to waive it) applying the Act to these persons
might even be more important.
We told the State Department representatives who met with us that we
were hesitant to amend the new statute until after it had been used on at
least a few occasions. Such a delay would presumably permit the Act to
be subjected to legal challenges of its constitutionality. However, I do
believe that amending the statute to apply it to State Department
employees and their family members abroad is necessary. Congress
should also consider what other personnel should be subjected to the
Act. For example, there are an increasingly large number of Justice
Department personnel, including Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Drug Enforcement Administration employees, stationed or operating
around the world. In some cases, these employees are accompanied by
family members. Should not these employees also be subject to
prosecution in the United States if they commit crimes abroad?
Unquestionably, the answer is yes. To ensure that this can happen,
Congress should amend the Act, at the appropriate time, to apply it to all
American government employees stationed abroad and their family
members who accompanying them.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the issues that remain to be considered, the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 is a significant development in
American criminal law. The Act closes a jurisdictional gap in the law
that has plagued DoD and Justice officials for decades. In doing so, the
Act will help the military instill confidence in its personnel and their
families that the government is doing all it can to protect them when it
sends them abroad in defense of the nation's interests. Knowing that the
Act has been passed will also build trust with our allies who will now be
more confident that the United States can effectively police the actions
of its personnel who are deployed to a foreign country. Most
importantly, closing the jurisdictional gap will help to ensure that justice
can be done whenever a member of our military or a person
accompanying it abroad commits a crime.
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S. 768
To establish court-martial jurisdiction over civilians serving with the Armed
Forces during contingency operations, and to establish Federal jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed outside the United States by former members
of the Armed Forces and civilians accompanying the Armed Forces
outside the United States.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
APRIL 13, 1999
Mr. SESSIONS (for himself and Mr. DEWINE) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To establish court-martial jurisdiction over civilians serving
with the Armed Forces during contingency operations,
and to establish Federal jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted outside the United States by former members
of the Armed Forces and civilians accompanying the
Armed Forces outside the United States.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Military and
5 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 1999".
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2
1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
2 Congress makes the following findings:
3 (1) Civilian employees of the Department of
4 Defense, and civilian employees of Department of
5 Defense contractors, provide critical support to the
6 Armed Forces of the United States that are de-
7 ployed during a contingency operation.
8 (2) Misconduct by such persons undermines
9 good order and discipline in the Armed Forces, and
10 jeopardizes the mission of the contingency operation.
11 (3) Military commanders need the legal tools to
12 address adequately misconduct by civilians serving
13 ith Armed Forces during a contingency operation.
14 (4) In its present state, military law does not
15 permit military commanders to address adequately
16 misconduct by civilians serving with Armed Forces,
17 except in time of a congressionally declared war.
18 (5) To address this need, the Uniform Code of
19 Military Justice should be amended to provide for
20 court-martial jurisdiction over civilians serving with
21 Armed Forces in places designated by the Secretary
22 of Defense during a "contingency operation" ex-
23 pressly designated as such by the Secretary of De-
24 fense.
25 (6) This limited extension of court-martial ju-
26 risdiction over civilians is dictated by military neces-
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1 sitY, is within the constitutional powers of Congress
2 to make rules for the government of the Armed
3 Forces, and, therefore, is consistent with the Con-
4 stitution of the United States and United States
5 public policy.
6 (7) Many thousand civilian employees of the
7 Department of Defense, civilian employees of De-
8 partment of Defense contractors, and civilian de-
9 pendents accompany the Armed Forces to installa-
10 tions in foreign countries.
11 (8) Misconduct among such civilians has been a
12 longstanding problem for military commanders and
13 other United States officials in foreign countries,
14 and threatens United States citizens, United States
15 property, and United States relations wAith host
16 countries.
17 (9) Federal criminal law does not apply to
18 many offenses committed outside of the United
19 States by such cixilians and, because host countries
20 often do not prosecute such offenses, serious crimes
21 often go unpunished and, to address this jurisdic-
22 tional gap, Federal law should be amended to punish
23 serious offenses committed by such civilians outside
24 the United States, to the same extent as if those of-
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1 fenses were committed within tile special maritime
2 and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
3 (10) Federal law (toes not apply to many crimes
4 committed outside the United States by members of
5 the Armed Forces who separate from the Armed
6 Forces before they can be identified, thus escaping
7 court martial jurisdiction and, to address this juris-
8 dictional gap, Federal law should be amended to
9 punish serious offenses committed by such persons
10 outside the United States, to the same extent as if
11 those offenses were committed within the special
12 maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
13 States.
14 SEC. 3. COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION.
15 (a) JURISDICTION DURING CONTINGENCY OPER-
16 ATIONS.-Seetion 802(a) of title 10, United States Code
17 (article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is
18 amended by inserting after paragraph (12) the following:
19 "(13) To the extent not covered by paragraphs
20 (10) and (11), persons not members of the armed
21 forces who, in support of an operation designated as
22 a contingency operation as described in section
23 10l(a)(13)(A) of this title, are serving with and ac-
24 companying an armed force in a place or places out-
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1 side the United States specified by the Secretary of
2 Defense, as follows:
3 "(A) Employees of the Department of De-
4 fense.
5 "(B) Employees of any Department of De-
6 fense contractor who are so serving in connec-
7 tion with the performance of a Department of
8 Defense contract.".
9 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by
10 subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enact-
II ment of this Act and apply with respect to acts or omis-
12 sions occurring on or after that date.
13 SEC. 4. FEDERAL JURISDICTION.
14 (a) CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED OUTSIDE THE
15 UNITED STATES.-Title 18, United States Code, is
16 amended by inserting after chapter 211 the following:
17 "CHAPTER 212-CRIMINAL OFFENSES
18 COMMITTED OUTSIDE THE UNITED
19 STATES
"See.
"3261. Criminal offenses committed by persons formerly sering with, or pres-
ently employed by or accompanying, the Armed Forces outside
the United States.
"3262. DeliverY to authorities of foreig i countries.
"3263. Regulations.
"3264. Definitions.
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I "§ 3261. Criminal offenses committed by persons for-
2 merly serving with, or presently em-
3 ployed by or accompanying, the Armed
4 Forces outside the United States
5 "(a) IN GENERAL.-Whoever, while serving with, em-
6 ployed by, or accompanying the Armed Forces outside of
7 the United States, engages in conduct that would con-
8 stitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more
9 than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within
10 the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
11 United States, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject
12 to a like punishment.
13 "(b) CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.-Nothing in this
14 chapter may be construed to deprive a court-martial, mill-
15 tan, commission, provost court, or other military tribunal
16 of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or of-
17 fenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried
18 by a court-martial, military commission, provost court, or
19 other military tribunal.
20 "(c) ACTION BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.-No pros-
21 ecution may be commenced against a person under this
22 section if a foreign government, in accordance with juris-
23 diction recognized by the United States, has prosecuted
24 or is prosecuting such person for the conduct constituting
25 such offense, except upon the approval of the Attorney
26 General or the Deputy Attorney General (or a person act-
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1 ing in either such capacity), which function of approval
2 shall not be delegated.
3 "(d) ARRESTS.-
4 "(1) LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.-The
5 Secretary of Defense may designate and authorize
6 any person serving in a law enforcement position in
7 the Department of Defense to arrest outside of the
8 United States any person described in subsection (a)
9 if there is probable cause to believe that such person
10 engaged in conduct that constitutes a criminal of-
11 fense under subsection (a).
12 "(2) RELEASE TO CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCE-
13 MENT.-A person arrested under paragraph (1)
14 shall be released to the custody of civilian law en-
15 forcement authorities of the United States for re-
16 moval to the United States for judicial proceedings
17 in relation to conduct referred to in such paragraph
18 unless-
19 "(A) such person is delivered to authorities
20 of a foreign country under section 3262; or
21 "(B) such person has had charges brought
22 against him or her under chapter 47 of title 10
23 for such conduct.
24 "(3) JUSTIFIABLE DELAY.-The arrest of a person
25 outside the United States by a person designated under
-S 768 IS
Catholic University Law Review
8
1 paragraph (I), and the removal of the arrested person to
2 the United States under paragraph (2), are extraordinary
3 circumstances justifying delay in bringing the arrested
4 person before a magistrate as required by the fourth
5 amendment to the United States Constitution and the
6 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7 "§ 3262. Delivery to authorities of foreign countries
8 "(a) IN GENERAL.-Any person designated and au-
9 thorized under section 3261(d) may deliver a person de-
10 scribed in section 3261(a) to the appropriate authorities
11 of a foreign country in which such person is alleged to
12 have engaged in conduct described in section 3261(a) of
13 this section if-
14 "(1) the appropriate authorities of that country
15 request the delivery of the person to such country
16 for trial for such conduct as an offense under the
17 laws of that country; and
18 "(2) the delivery of such person to that country
19 is authorized by a treaty or other international
20 agreement to which the United States is a party.
21 "(b) DETERMINATION BY THE SECRETARY.-The
22 Secretary of Defense shall determine which officials of a
23 foreign country constitute appropriate authorities for pur-
24 poses of this section.
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1 "§ 3263. Regulations
2 "The Secretary of Defense shall issue regulations
3 governing the apprehension, detention, and removal of
4 persons under this chapter. Such regulations shall be uni-
5 form throughout the Department of Defense.
6 "§ 3264. Definitions
7 "In this chapter-
8 "(1) a person is 'accompanying the Armed
9 Forces outside of the United States' if the person-
10 "(A) is a dependent of-
I1 "(i) a member of the Armed Forces;
12 "(ii) a civilian employee of a military
13 department or of the Department of De-
14 fense; or
15 "(iii) a Department of Defense con-
16 tractor, or is a dependent of an employee
17 of a Department of Defense contractor;
18 "(B) is residing with such member, civilian
19 employee, contractor, or contractor employee
20 outside the United States; and
21 "(C) is not a national of or ordinarily resi-
22 dent in the host nation;
23 "(2) the term 'Armed Forces' has the same
24 meaning as in section 101(a)(4) of title 10; and
25 "(3) a person is 'employed by the Armed
26 Forces outside of the United States' if the person-
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1 "(A) is employed as a civilian employee of
2 the Department of Defense, as a Department of
3 Defense contractor, or as an employee of a De-
4 partment of Defense contractor;
5 "(B) is present or residing outside of the
6 United States in connection with such employ-
7 ment; and
8 "(C) is not a national of or ordinarily resi-
9 dent in the host nation.".
10 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of chapters
11 at the beginning of part II of title 18, United States Code,
12 is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter
13 211 the following:
"212. Criminal Offenses Committed Outside the United
S ta te s .......................................................................... 3 6 2 1 "
0
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To amend title 18, United States Code, to establish Federal jurisdiction
over offenses committed outside the United States by persons employed
by or accompaiiying the Armed Forces, or by members of the Armed
Forces who are released or separated from active duty prior to being
identified and prosecuted for the commission of such offenses, and for
other piiirposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NovEMBERi 16, 1999
Mr. C(tAMlLMis (for himself an(d Mr. MCCOLLUM) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addi-
tiol to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provi-
sions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To amend title 18, United States Code, to establish Federal
jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the United
States by persons employed by or accompanying the
Armed Forces, or by members of the Armed Forces
who are released or separated from active duty prior
to being identified and prosecuted for the commission
of such offenses, and for other purposes.
I Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
2 This Act may be cited as the "Military
3 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 1999".
4 SEC. 2. FEDERAL JURISDICTION.
5 (a) CERTAIN CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED OUT-
6 SI)E TIE UNITED STATEs.-Title 18, United States
7 Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 211 the fol-
8 lowing new chapter:
9 "CHAPTER 212-MILITARY EXTRATERRITORIAL
10 JURISDICTION
"See
"3261. Criminal offenses committed by vertain members of the Armed Forces
and by persons employed by or aeromljanying the Armed
Forces outside the United States.
"3262. Delivery to authorities of foreign countries.
"3263. Regulations.
"3264. Definitions.
11 "§ 3261. Criminal offenses committed by certain mem-
12 bers of the Armed Forces and by persons
13 employed by or accompanying the Armed
14 Forces outside the United States
15 "(a) Whoever engages in conduct outside the United
16 States that would constitute an offense punishable by im-
17 prisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been
18 engaged in within the special maritime and territorial ju-
19 risdiction of the United States-
20 "(1) while employed by or accompanying the
21 Armed Forces outside the United States; or
.HR 3380 IH
Catholic University Law Review
3
1 "(2) while a member of the Armed Forces sub-
2 ject to chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of
3 Military Justice) in accordance with section 802 of
4 such title, and thereafter ceases to be subject to
5 such chapter without having been tried by court-
6 martial with respect to such conduct;
7 shall be punished as provided for that offense.
8 "(b) Nothing in this chapter may be construed to de-
9 prive a court-martial, military commission, provost court,
10 or other military tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction with
11 respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the
12 law of war may be tried by a court-martial, military com-
1 3 mission, provost court, or other military tribunal.
14 "(c) No prosecution may be commenced against a
15 person under this section if a foreign government, in ac-
16 cordance with jurisdiction recognized by the United
17 States, has prosecuted or is prosecuting such person for
18 the conduct constituting such offense, except upon the ap-
19 proval of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney
20 General (or a person acting in either such capacity), which
21 function of approval may not be delegated.
22 "(d)(1) The Secretary of Defense may designate and
23 authorize any person serving in a law enforcement position
24 in the Department of Defense to arrest, in accordance
25 with applicable international agreements, outside the
oHR 3380 i
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1 United States any person described in subsection (a) if
2 there is probable cause to believe that such person engaged
3 in~ conduct that constitutes a criminal offense under sub-
4 section (a).
5 "(2) A person arrested under paragraph (1) shall be
6 delivered as soon as practicable to the custody of civilian
7 law enforcement authorities of the United States for re-
8 moval to the United States for judicial proceedings in rela-
9 tion to conduct referred to in such paragraph unless-
10 "(A) such person is delivered to authorities of
11 a foreign country under section 3262; or
12 "(B) such person has had charges brought
13 against him or her under chapter 47 of title 10 for
14 such conduct.
15 "§ 3262. Delivery to authorities of foreign countries
16 "(a) Any person designated and authorized under
17 section 3261(d) may deliver a person described in section
18 3261(a) to the appropriate authorities of a foreign country
19 in which such person is alleged to have engaged in conduct
20 described in section 3261(a) if-
21 "(1) appropriate authorities of that country re-
22 quest the delivery of the person to such country for
23 trial for such conduct as an offense under the laws
24 of that country; and
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1 "(2) the delivery of such person to that country
2 is authorized by a treaty or other international
3 agreement to which the United States is a party.
4 "(b) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
5 the Secretary of State, shall determine which officials of
6 a foreigni country constitute appropriate authorities for
7 purposes of this section.
8 "§ 3263. Regulations
9 "(a) The Secretary of Defense, after consultation
10 with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
11 shall prescribe regulations governing the apprehension, de-
12 tention, delivery, and removal of persons under this chap-
13 ter. Such regulations shall be uniform throughout the De-
14 partment of Defense.
15 "(b)(1) The Secretary of Defense, after consultation
16 with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
17 shall prescribe regulations requiring that, to the maximum
18 extent practicable, notice shall be provided to any person
19 employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside
20 the United States who is not a national of the United
21 States that such person is potentially subject to the crimi-
22 nal jurisdiction of the United States under this chapter.
23 "(2) A failure to provide notice in accordance with
24 the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall not
25 defeat the jurisdiction of a court of the United States or
.HR 3380 f:i
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1 provide a defense iii any judicial proceeding arising under
2 this chapter.
3 "§ 3264. Definitions
4 "As used in this chapter-
5 "(1) to be 'employed by the Armed Forces out-
6 side the United States' means to be-
7 "(A) employed as a civilian employee of the
8 Department of Defense (including a non-
9 appropriated fund instrumentality of the De-
10 partment), as a Department of Defense con-
1 I tractor (including a subcontractor at any tier),
12 or as an employee of a Department of Defense
13 contractor (including a subcontractor at any
14 tier);
15 "(B) present or residing outside the
16 United States in connection with such employ-
17 ment; and
18 "(C) not a national of or ordinarily resi-
19 dent in the host nation;
20 "(2) to be 'accompanying the Armed Forces
21 outside the United States' means to be-
22 "(A) a dependent of-
23 "(i) a member of the Armed Forces;
24 "(ii) a civilian employee of a military
25 department or of the Department of De-
.HR 3380 EH
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1 fense (including a nonappropriated fund
2 instrumentality of the Department); or
3 "(iii) a Department of Defense con-
4 tractor (including a subcontractor at any
5 tier) or al employee of a Department of
6 Defense contractor (including a subcon-
7 tractor at any tier);
8 "(B) residing with such member, civilian
9 employee, contractor, or contractor employee
10 outside the United States; and
11 "(C) not a national of or ordinarily resi-
12 dent in the host nation; and
13 "(3) 'Armed Forces' has the meaning given the
14 term 'armed forces' in section 101(a)(4) of title
15 10.".
16 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE OF REGULATION.-The regu-
17 lations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense under see-
18 tion 3263 of title 18, United States Code, as added by
19 subsection (a) of this section, and any amendments to
20 those regulations, shall not take effect before the date that
21 is 90 days after the date on which the Secretary submits
22 a report containing those regulations or amendments (as
23 applicable) to the Committee on the Judiciary of the
24 House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judi-
25 ciarv of the Senate.
oHR 3380 111
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I (C) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of chapters
2 for part II of title 18, United States Code, is amended
3 by inserting after the item relating to chapter 211 the fol-
4 lowing new item:
"212. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction ..................... 3261".
0
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APPENDIX C
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3380
OFFERED BY MR. MCCOLLUM
(Page & line nos. refer to Subcommittee Amendment in the
Nature of a Substitute as Ordered Reported on May 11, 2000)
Amend the text to read as follows:
I SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
2 This Act may be cited as the "Militan,
3 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000".
4 SEC. 2. FEDERAL JURISDICTION.
5 (a) CERTAIN CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED OUT-
6 SIDE THE UNITED STATES.-Title 18, United States
7 Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 211 the fol-
8 loing new chapter:
9 "CHAPTER 212-MILITARY EXTRATERRITORIAL
10 JURISDICTION
"Sec.
"3261. Criminal offenses committed by certain members of the Anned Forces
and by persons employed bx or aceompanying the Aimed
Forces outside the United States.
3262 Arest and commitment.
"3263. DeliveiY to authorities of foreign countries.
3264. Limitation on removal; initial appearance.
:3265. Regulations.
:3266. Definitions.
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I "§ 3261. Criminal offenses committed by certain mem-
2 bers of the Armed Forces and by persons
3 employed by or accompanying the Armed
4 Forces outside the United States
5 "(a) Whoever engages in conduct outside the United
6 States that would constitute an offense punishable by im-
7 prisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been
8 engaged in within the special nmaritime and territorial ju-
9 risdietion of the United States-
10 "(1) while employed by or accompanying the
11 Armed Forces outside the United States; or
12 "(2) while a member of the Armed Forees sub-
13 ject to chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of
14 Military Justice),
15 shall be punished as provided for that offense.
16 "(b) No prosecution may be commenced against a
17 person under this seetion if a foreign government, in ac-
18 cordance w\ith jurisdiction recognized by the United
19 States, has prosecuted or is prosecuting such person for
20 the conduct constituting such offense, except upon the ap-
21 proval of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney
22 General (or a person acting in either such capacity), which
23 function of approval may not be delegated.
24 "(c) Nothing in this chapter may be construed to de-
25 prive a court-martial, military commission, provost court,
26 or other military tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction with
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1 respect to offenders or offenses that hv statute or by the
2 law of war may he tried hy a court-martial, rilitarY coim-
3 mission, lrovost court, or other militarY tribunal.
4 "(d) No prosecution may be Commenced against a
5 member of the Armed Forces subject to chapter 47 of title
6 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice) under this see-
7 tion unless-
8 "(1) such member ceases to be subject to such
9 chapter; or
10 "(2) an indictment or information charges that
11 the member committed the offense with 1 or more
12 other defendants, at least 1 of whom is not subject
13 to such chapter.
14 "§ 3262. Arrest and commitment
15 "(a) The Secretary of Defense may designate and an-
16 thorize any person serving in a law enforcement position
17 in the Department of Defense to arrest, in accordance
18 with applicable international agreements, outside the
19 United States any person described in section 3261(a) if
20 there is probable cause to believe that such person violated
21 3261(a).
22 "(b) Except as provided in sections 3263 and 3264,
23 a person arrested under subsection (a) shall be delivered
24 as soon as practicable to the custody of civilian law en-
25 forcement authorities of the United States for removal to
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I tile Uni ited States for judicial proceedings iII relation to
2 onduct referred to in such subsection runless such person
3 has had eharges brought against hi n oi her under chaFpter
4 47 of title 10 for such conduct.
5 "§ 3263. Delivery to authorities of foreign countries
6 "(a) Any person designated and authorized under
7 section 3262(a) may deliver a person described in section
8 3261 (a) to the appropriate authorities of a foreign country
9 in which such person is alleged to have violated section
10 3261(a) if-
11 "(1) appropriate authorities of that country re-
12 quest the delivery of the person to such country for
13 trial for such conduct as an offense under the laws
14 of that country; and
15 "(2) the delivery of such person to that country
16 is authorized by a treaty or other international
17 agreement to which the United States is a party.
18 "(b) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
19 the Secretary of State, shall determine which officials of
20 a foreign country constitute appropriate authorities for
21 purposes of this section.
22 "§ 3264. Limitation on removal; initial appearance
23 "(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), and except
24 for a person delivered to authorities of a foreign country,
25 under section 3263, a person arrested under section
Catholic University Law Review
I 32i2(a) shall not, before ti(t indictment of the person (or
2 the filing' of an infhrniation if indictinent is waived), he
3 removed-
4 "(1) to the United States; or
5 "(2) to any foreign country other than a coun-
6 tr
' 
in which such person is believed to have violated
7 section 3261(a).
8 "(b) The Secretam of Defense may w-aive the limita-
9 tion in subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that
10 military necessity so requires, in which case the person
11 shall be removed to the nearest United States military in-
12 stallation outside the United States adequate to detain the
13 person and to facilitate the initial appearance described
14 in subsection (c).
15 "(c)(1) In the case of each person arrested under sec-
16 tion 3262(a) who is not delivered to authorities of a for-
17 eign country under section 3263, the initial appearance
18 of that person under the Federal Rules of Criminal
19 Procedure-
20 "(A) shall be conducted by a federal magistrate
21 judge; and
22 "(B) may be carried out by telephony or such
23 other means that enables voice communication
24 among the participants, including any counsel rep-
25 resenting the person.
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1 "(2) In conducting the initial appearance, the federal
2 ma gi strai te .jd(Ige shall also determine whether there is
3 probable cause to believe that an offense mider section
4 3261(a) was committed and that the person committed it.
5 "(3) This subsection shall not affect whether, or in
6 what manner, any preliminary examination of the person
7 under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is con-
8 ducted, except that the person shall be physically present
9 at any such preliminary examination.
10 "(4) The location of the federal magistrate judge eon-
11 ducting the initial appearance under this subsection shall
12 not establish venue, under section 3238 of this title or oth-
13 erise, for any further proceedings concerning the person.
14 "§ 3265. Regulations
15 "(a) The Secretary of Defense, after consultation
16 wvith the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
17 shall prescribe regulations governing the apprehension, de-
18 tention, deliver,, and removal of persons under this chap-
19 ter and the facilitation of proceedings under section 3264.
20 Such regulations shall be uniform throughout the Depart-
21 ment of Defense.
22 "(b)(1) The Secretary of Defense, after consultation
23 with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
24 shall prescribe regulations requiring that, to the maximum
25 extent practicable, notice shall be proided to any person
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1 employed by companying the Armed Forces outside
2 the United States who is not a national of the United
3 States that such person is potentially sulect to the crimi-
4 nal jurisdiction of the United States under this chapter.
5 "(2) A failure to provide notice in accordance with
6 the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall not
7 defeat the jurisdiction of a court of the United States or
8 provide a defense in any judicial proceeding arising under
9 this chapter.
10 "(c) The regulations prescribed under this section,
11 and any amendments to those regulations, shall not take
12 effect before the date that is 90 days after the date on
13 which the Secretary of Defense submits a report con-
14 taining those regulations or amendments (as applicable)
15 to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep-
16 resentatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
17 Senate.
18 "§ 3266. Definitions
19 "As used in this chapter:
20 "(1) The term 'employed by the Armed Forces
21 outside the United States' means-
22 "(A) employed as a civilian employee of the
23 Department of Defense (including a non-
24 appropriated fund instrumentality of the De-
25 partment), as a Department of Defense con-
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I tractor (including a subcontractor at any tier),
2 or as ar employee of a Department of l)efense
3 contractor (including a subcontractor at any
4 tier);
5 "(B) present or residing outside the
6 United States in connection with such employ-
7 inent; and
8 "(C) not a national of or ordinarily resi-
9 dent in the host nation.
10 "(2) The term 'accompanying the Armed
I 1 Forces outside the United States' means-
12 "(A) a dependent of-
13 "(i) a member of the Armed Forces;
14 "(ii) a ci-vilian employee of the De-
15 partment of Defense (including a non-
16 appropriated fund instrumentality of the
17 Department); or
18 "(iii) a Department of Defense con-
19 tractor (including a subcontractor at any
20 tier) or an employee of a Department of
21 Defense contractor (including a subcon-
22 tractor at any tier);
23 "(B) residing with such member, civilian
24 employee, contractor, or contractor employee
25 outside the United States; and
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l "(C) not a national of or ordinarily resi-
2 dent it] tile host iation.
3 "(3) The term Armed Forces' has the meaning
4 given the term 'armed forces' in section 101(a)(4) of
5 title 10.".
6 (b) CLERIC.-AL A.NIENDNIENT.-The table of chapters
7 for part II of title 18, United States Code, is amended
8 by inserting after the item relating to chapter 211 the fol-
9 lowing new item:
"212. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction ..................... 3261".
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